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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.
Objectives and Approach.
This study is intended to provide perspectives on the
involvement of the federal government in civilian-sector R&D -
how it evolved, how it has performed, and what guidelines can
be suggested for improving future effectiveness. These judg-
ments are informed from a number of sources — consciously
selected so as to view these issues from differing perspec-
tives — but are disciplined by a coherent framework estab-
lished by the authors. The inputs were:
1. Reviews of past trends and current status of
federal science and technology policy, industrial
research, and economic theory related to technical
change.
2. Analysis of recent experimental initiatives by
the federal government to support civilian-sector
R&D through various approaches.
3. Group discussions and individual interviews with
industry executives and government officials to
obtain their judgments on what has worked and
what has not, and on suggestions for improved
procedures and program concepts.
4. Substantive studies and analyses of the influence
c?. federal actions on technical change in seven
.. sy industries -.- aviation, Pharmaceuticals,
computers, housing, automobiles, agriculture,
and semiconductors. These were conducted by a
group of distinguished economists, and provide
a firm base of historical anecdotal experiences
over a range of industries. % .' • .
Published separately as Richard R. Nelson, ed., Technical
Change in U.S. Industry: A Cross-Industry Analysis,
Elmsford, N..Y. : Pergamon Press (forthcoming in 1982).
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The final presentation is in two volumes, of which
this is the first. The industry-sector studies will be
published separately, although its table of contents is printed
here and a review of its contents is given as Chapter III.
This first volume is intended to stand alone and its conclu-
- sions are informed by, but not limited to, those of the
< separate industry-studies volume. A summary listing of
L criteria to be considered in future federal support of civil-
ian-sector R&D is given at the end of this Exacutive Summary.
Contents.
The years since World War II have seen two distinct
trends — two changes of the tide — in policy towards
direct financial support for civilian-sector R&D.
Since World War II, a steady growth of activism in :;;,
federal funding for R&D evolved from the support of technical
infrastructure to a massive expansion of public-sector R&D i; i
for areas — e.g., defense, space — in which the government
was the final customer. In the '60s and early '70s, the ';;'
first philosophical shift occurred, placing increasing empha.-:;;
sis on areas in which the government was not the final ;:f:
customer — transportation, anergy, housing, communications,::
materials. This raised some very specific policy issues,
involving such things as program selection, priorities,
conduct of research, and transfer to the private sector —-•;
in short, the effeectiveness of the federal involvement.
Today, a second shift is underway. Many of these more
specific if i;ues remain. But they -- along with some newly-
important larger issues -- must now be understood in relation
to the directions being established by the Reagan administra-
tion since January, 1981. Nowadays, the question of whether
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a federal activity is called for at all precedes the
question of which activities will be most effective under
which conditions. Inevitably, it seems, there will be a
retrenchment in certain types of R&D activities, an ebb in
those functions performed by the federal government that
had emerged almost as a by-product of the R&D momentum
built up before 1970.
This current change of tide can be guided by an
understanding of how we arrived at our present position,
by what we can learn from historical experiences, and by
the judgments of senior executives from both government
and industry.
: The present status of the total civilian-sector R&D
effort in the U.S. derives from three main streams of
activity and thought:
i First, the federal government emphasized support for
technical infrastructure — basic research, generic technology,
training of scientists and engineers. It devoted very con-
siderable funds to the technologies and facilities required
for public-sector activities — national security, space,
health. And it moved somewhat into direct support of civilian-
sector R&D.
Second, industrial research grew steadily, so that
corporate funding of R&D is now about $33.9 billion, or about
47 percent of total national R&D expenditures. Thus, the
private sector became relatively self-sufficient in generating
the R&D it needs to support present products and processes as
well as growth of new business.
Third, economic theory drew attention to the social
value created by private R&D; to the implications for R&D
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investment of the approprlability (or lack of appropri-
ability) of an individual corporation's R&D; and to the
contributions of R&D to industrial productivity and inter-
national trade.. This work was used as philosophical
justification for federal support of civilian-sector R&D,
and has served to focus attention oh the importance of a
healthy technical foundation for both public-.and private-
sector objectives, .
These trends serve to describe where we are on a
national scale. Further appreciation of the effects that
have been felt by specific sectors is provided in our
detailed examination of seven industry sectors. The influ-
ence of federal actions and policies on technical change in
each of these industries gives us a rich background of
specific cases from which we gain a broad perspective about
the effectiveness of federal actions under a range of
circumstances.
It is clear that the federal government has in fact
played a role in producing technical change in almost every
industrial sector. Direct R&D support has been one instru-
ment, as in semiconductors, but indirect instruments have
played a larger part. Procurement associated with R&D
support has been a powerful force in aircraft and computers.
Regulations have influenced the pace and direction of change
in automobiles, housing, and Pharmaceuticals. Each industry
has to be studied carefully to understand the sources of
technical change. The converse, of course, is that govern-
ment actions intended to bring about technical change should
be tailored to each specific sector.
A number of experimental initiatives were attempted
by the federal government during .the middle and late 1970s.
These were intended to stimulate technical change and
-vii-
innovation in the private sector. We look at. several of
them in this study as possible sources of lessons for the
future.
Two of these — CARP (Cooperative Automotive Research
Program) and COGENT (Coopsrative Generic Technology) --
failed to take hold. This, we believe, is clearly bound up
with their failures to develop adequate political constitu-
encies. The initiatives did not come from industry; they
did not represent what industry thought to be the highest-
priority problems in basic science or generic technology;
and they did not necessarily represent the optimum alloca-
tion of available technical resources.
At the other extreme, a program to encourage joint
university-industry research initiated by the National
Science Foundation has had moderate success. It is an
c;fi"ov o expose universities to the scientific needs of
iiidi:.--.!'.r> , and to stimulate better working relations between
the two sectors. Not every industrial research organization
chooses to become a partner, but enough have done so to
augur well for continuation at o reasonable level.
An industrial energy conservation program in the
Department of Energy has demonstrated modest benefits for
both public objectives (saving energy) and private benefits
(reducing costs). Results were reasonable, though not
dramatic, and the program demonstrated an incremental ap-
proach: the private benefits did not justify the total R&D
investment required, but the anticipated public benefits
could be obtained by adding funds of the federal government
to the private funds.
Many themes emerge from the materials and analyses
used for this study. A number are discussed in detail in
Chapter V. .
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One obvious and pervasive thema is the r^ed to
achieve proper and constructive linkages between the
federal agencies and the industrial community. The con-
version of technical advances to new products, processes,
and services occurs within the private sector. Decisions
about investment, manufacturing, and distribution are made
in the private sector. Thus, federal programs to support
civilian-sector R&D require private inputs for planning
and setting priorities, and must obtain participation in
some form to smooth the conduct of R&D and the ultimate
transfer to use. Clearly, a preferred situation is for the
;private sector to identify a desired federal activity in
advance, something' that was demonstrably lacking in_the CARP
and COGENT programs.
: • . I
'..'•• There is widespread agreement that the primary federal
;role in civilian R&D is to strengthen the technical infra-
structure —training, basic research, and generic
technologies. Here, too, the specific mechanisms are ;...^ ort-
ant. Universities play the major third-party role between
;federal funding and eventual civilian-sector use. Appropriate
'linkages with the r^ivate sector are critical to be sure that
the universities are aware of the basic scientific and engin-
eering needs of industry; to encourage industry adaptation of
university research; and _o provide exposure of graduates to
career opportunities.
A principal factor in the successful pursuit and even-
tual use of any technical advance is the existence of a
technical community possessing the range of knowledge and
skills needed to implement that advance. Federal programs,
wh'ich can develop all needed skills in public-sector missions,
cannot control this availability for programs in the civilian
sector. Further, private sector involvement is needed to
provide judgments on feasibility and timeliness of technologies
potentially available for economic conversion.
-ix-
Indirect actions cf the federal government can have
considerable influence on technical change — regulations,
tax policies, and, j^articularly, procurement. Thus, federal
R&D programs of an applied nature can be most effective when
coupled with some specific federal mission. In public-sector
areas — e.g., defense and space, in which the government is
the customer -- federal applied R&D has been extremely
successful. There is some indication that this combination
can also work to various extents in areas where the government
is no_t the principal user, such as solar energy, electronics,
•*nd agriculture. As the case of federal involvement in
synthetic fuels suggests, of course, such federal procurement-
cum-R&D ir not therefore automatically desirable.
An important side-interest in this study is the by-
product effect in many industry sectors of public-sector R&D.;
There continues to be disappointment and over-expectation : i
about direct "spin-off," i.e., the easy conversion of products
and processes developed for defense or space objectives into,;
economic civilian use. But there has probably been an under-
estimation of the broad economic value of the stronger base 11:'-.
of science and technology this public research provided — a . •
base that has helped generate new industries, expand existing
ones, and contribute to increased productivity generally. ?
A major trend that should oe encouraged is the ii
increased willingness and ability of particular industries ;.
to act collectively to strengthen their scientific and
technological base. This has been shown in recent efforts
of the electric: power, gas, and other industries. It is
also being shown in new initiatives by the chemical and
semiconductor industries. To date, these efforts have
focused on basic research, and may thus have considerable
influence on related programs of the federal government in
university research. These actions are in strict confornance
with anti-trust laws. Our growing concern with international
competitiveness may lead to opportunities for collective
action in more applied artas. Such initiatives call for
consideration of possible modification of anti-trust law
and policy.
Suggested Criteria for Future Policy
The following is a distillation of our findings. We
hope these points can serve as, broadly speaking, a set of
guidelines for future policy toward civilian-sector 1UD.
Nature of Contents
Federal support for technical activities intended
for tl'.e civilian sector, whether direct or indirect,
should he specific to the industrial sector in
question.
TYie principal emphasis of. federal support for
civilian-sector 1UD should go towards strengthen-
ing the technical infrastructure ami encouraging
generic science and technology, but with careful
attention to those methods of implementation most
compatible with needs of the civilian technical
community.
Federal procurement of goods and services (and
sometimes other federal actions) justified by
a mandate and supported by a constituency can
often have salutary effects on civilian technology
when such procurement, is Jinked to federal K&D
on the' technologies or products being bought.
A balance of technical resources should be main-
tained by providing a level of federal support
for undirected basic research adequate to ensure
objectivity and independence of direction in the
research community.
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Federal support for applied research and directed
basic research should be guided by specific
arguments about particular technologies and types
of projects "undersupported" by the private sector
not by general arguments about the overall
inadequacy of private IUD spending. And any
proposals for programs to intervene in civilian-
sector R&D should have .a clc^i and specific
institutional structure in mind to allocate the
research dollars.
Nature of Mechanisms
Cooperative RSO programs initiated and conducted
by industry should be encouraged by both direct
and indirect support of appropriate federal
agencies.
Federal support for directed basic research
intended for the civilian sector should include
specific mechanisms for linkages between industry
and any third-party institutions conducting such
research, whether government or academic.
Federal support for applied research intended
for the civilian sector should include specific
mechanisms to obtain industry inputs, cooperation,
and, where appropriate, • participation..
Federal actions in the civilian sector should
flow from private initiatives whenever possible:
mechanisms should he developed to encourage
private sector initiatives in identifying
technical needs, rc'commcnd ing appropriate roles
for government relative to those needs, and in
suggesting techniques for transfer of the results.
Public sector R'fiD, e.g., defense and space, should
be conducted so as tc- encourage linkages with the
civilian s.ector in areas of basic science and
generic technologies, when appropriate, during the
planning and conduct of research.
Linkages among unxversity-industry-government
programs should be promoted, to strengthen the
general technical Infrastructure, improve the
flow ol information concerning technical advances
and needs, and expedite transfer of sv-ch advances.
-xi i -
I. THE CHANGING TIDE.
In 1971, President Nixon assigned Mr. William M.
Magruder, an experienced aerospace executive, the task of
developing a list of major technical activities, to be sup-
ported in soma degree by the federal government, which would
serve to utilize available technical manpower and knowledge
in programs that could support and stimulate economic growth.
This was referred to as the New Technology Opportunities
Program (NTOP).
In hindsight,- this initiative appears as a tangible
divider between two eras in federal R&D policy. From 1940
to 1970, federal support of R&D was growing; but that sup-
port was directed largely toward defense, atomic energy and
space — areas in which the government was itself the final;;
customer for the R&D and the new technologies it product.J. J :
Other sectors benefited through "spin-offs." After 1970, ;M
however, federal R&D support was used increasingly as a way!
of supporting and stimulating the general economy -- in areas
such as transportation, housing, communication, and*, energy;. !:
Mr. Magruder's assignment came at a time of slow-down:
in the military R&D spending, so that unemployment among • • . ;
certain high-technology personnel, notably aerospace engirt-
 :
eers, became an unwelcome new phenomenon in the United : .
States. Concurrently, an economic recession in the early
1970s focused attention on industrial needs and on mechanisms
that might revive a lagging economy. An approach that would
appear to address both problems had obvious appeal. But
wr.ile the dimly perceived issues of both policy and prac-
tice were slowly being formulated and discussed, the economy
revived, technical specialists were absorbed (possibly
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involving conversion of skills) and the plan for major
government involvement in support of civilian-sector R&D
was filed away.
From this first aborted step contemplating broad
action, there followed a growing series of specific federal
programs, each motivated by some particular problem concern-
ing an industry sector — e.g., energy or automotive — or
an element in our general industrial base — e.g., materials
availability or adequate long-range research. By the late
1970s, federal agencies were conducting a wide range of acti-
vities, and there were new legislative proposals to add more.
: Like all questions of public policy, analzying the role
;and; effectiveness of government involvement in civilian-
sector RiD cannot be accomplished in an intellectual or poli-
tical vacuum. Such an analysis must necessarily start with
the premises —oft^n unarticulated — that accompany the
political and institutional structures it assumes.
Until very recently, the premises upon which government
policy toward civilian-sector R&D rested were developing in
a fairly clear and seemingly constant direction: greater
government involvement.
One indication of this tendency is apparent from the
numbers. In constant 1972 dollars, federal R&D spending on
defense declined from $11.9 billion to $8.5 billion between
the years 1967 to 1980, while the component devoted to civilian-
sector interests rose over that same period from $4.9 billion
to $7.2 billion. But the trend is not merely quantitative.
Government involvement in civilian RSD changed in character,
T7Willis H. Shapley and Don I. Phillips, Research and
Development: AAAS Report IV, Washington, D.C.: American
Association for the Advancement of Science, 1979, p.26,
and Shapley, ct. al., Research and Development; AAAS
Report VI, Washington, D.C.: American Association for the
Advancement of Science, 1981, p. 17.
moving from a regime in which the support of basic research
and the molding of technological infrastructure was itself
the goal to one in which the support of R&D was an announced
means to various social goals — notably the goal of techno-
logical superiority in international trade. As such, this
conception of federal R&D policy toward the civilian sector
was only one manifestation of what all political persuasions
agree to have been an increasingly interventionist development
of general government after World War II.
This is not to say that the altered and enlarged
federal role in R&D evolved smoothly or without incident;
in fact, as we will try to document below, the premises of
federal R&D policy reigning in October, 1980, were the legacy
of a very episodic history. Technology policy in the last
few decades was shaped by at least three periods of policy
activism which, although failures politically, were ulti-
mately victories intellectually — at least in the sense that
until recently they set the tone for Executive Branch policy.
This study was commissioned and begun during the last
of the activist periods, that of the departed Carter
Administration. As a result, the study started out from
what we might call a "pragmatic" base. Given the increasing
government support of civilian-sector R&D, we asked, what
criteria should the policy-maker use to extract optimum
effectiveness from the various government R&D programs?
There.were two sources of material from which to develop
such criteria. First, there is historical experience in each
industry relevant to understanding the sources of technical
change; the conditions for its introduction and use; and the.
impact of federal policies upon it. In our view, it is
important to recognize that each industry is unique in its
needs and conditions —a.fact far top often overlooked in
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discussions of federal civilian-sector R&D policies. There-
fore, there is much to be gained by a review and analysis of
the factors influencing technical change in each of a number
of industries differing in, for example, their R&D intensity
and the degree of federally funded R&D.
Second, the expanding federal R&D activity in the past
ten vears that was intended to support or stimulate specific
industrial sectors has given rise to considerable empirical
data and experiences, viz., (a) new program initiatives put
forward by the government to explore various mechanisms for
interactions with industry — e.g., the Cooperative Automo-
tive Research Program (CARP) — and (b) a group of government
and industry executives who have devoted increasing amounts
of time to working with these me«:rianisms and with each other,
taking into account the combined government-industry technical
efforts in planning their own activities for creating techni-.
eal change. Discussions with these executives aboi>. the
:effectiveness of both the newer exploratory programs and the
older, established programs could provide a rich base of
^judgments on the role and workability of federal R&D support.
The material for this study did indeed draw upon these
two principal sources, and this report is based primarily on
them, on other published references, and on the judgments and
interpretations of the authors. A group of knowledgeable
economists has prepared a set of studies on the history of
technical change in seven major industries affected in vary-
ing degree by federal actions. An overview of these analyses
is presented in Chapter III, and the complete set is appearing
as a separate publication. Thes^ provide references and
perspectives for much of this present report. Chapter IV
describes, categorizes, and analyzes several of the new
initiatives proposed during the Carter term.
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We also did in fact interview and meet with many
industry and government officials both individually and at
several special seminars.
But, although this study has its roots in the ground
of the last administration, its fruit ripened in the climate
of the present administration. This has influenced in a
critical Wciy the questions and emphases that govern the con-
clusions o:: this study.
i There is a strong case to be made that the last few
months have seen the beginning of a reversal in the post-
war trend in federal policy toward civilian-sector R&D.
To put it somewhat crudely, the first question raised nowa-
days is: is there any appropriate role for direct federal
R&D support in the area under consideration? Only when and
if the answer is "yes" does a concern with the "what" and
Vhow" arise.
•; This changing tide affects the emphasis of this study,
even though it arrives during the last third of the time
allocated. Discussions with government and industry execu-
tives brought out sharply the increasing priority on
philosophy -- on the question of "why?" -- that has lately
replaced the earlier question of "how?"
• All of this, of course, required considerable attention
by the authors to the reordering and re-evaluation of the
material already in hand. For example, government initiatives
that were studied as possible exarr iles of future growth now
become historical examples of largely intellectual interest.
But this shifting of premises is not so much-a problem
for the study as it is a challenge and an opportunity. With
one foot in each of two very different realms, we perhaps
-5-
gain a perspective that is not confined by any particular
set of narrow premises. At the very least, the study offers
an element of continuity in a time of change, and should
therefore provide a useful bridge between past and future
science and technology policy.
-6-
II. R&D POLICIES IN PERSPECTIVE.
In order to fill in some of the vacuum that normally
surrounds discussions of federal R&D policy, this chapter
attempts to place the relevant issues in a proper (a) histor-
ical, (b) practical, and (c) tneoretical context.
We need to begin with some definitions.
. 1. The participation of the government in an area of
technical activity can be active or passive with regard to
its role in directing the allocation of technical resources
towards specific ends. Thus, government support for the
general scientific and technical base of the country -- the
programs of the National Bureau of Standards, the basic j •
research objectives of the National Science Foundation,
 ;; ::
fellowship grants for university study — can be considered
passive. An example of an active intervention, by contrast,
might be the government commitment to titanium development;, :
dating from the late 1940s, that specifically sought the ;;;.'•.';
development of light-weight metals for military aircraft;. ;
(The term "active" is not intended to describe the physical ;
intensity of the R&D effort, but rather to distinguish the
specificity and goal-directedness of the government , ;
involvement.) ; i
•
2. The mechanisms used by the federal government to
influence civilian-sector R&D may be direct or indirecj:.
The specific allocation of money to fund a desired technical
program like solar cells, whether in government laboratories
or by outside contracts, is direct R&D support. The provi-
sion of tax credits for the installation of solar collectors
-7-
is an indirect mechanism to stimulate a market for such
devices, and thereby to create incentives for private R&D
efforts. The former method specifies the conduct of an
R&D program approved by the government; the latter provides
incentives for moving in a certain direction, but does not
mandate R&D or specify its type or extent. .Other indirect
mechanisms would include general tax and subsidy policies,
tariffs, regulation — both economic regulation and the
newer "social" regulation — and even macroeconomic policies.
A. Historical Perspective.
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the direct efforts
of the ifederal government in civilian R&D were fundamentally
passive.
; jA patent system was specified in the U.S. Constitution
and the Patent Office was the earliest federal presence in
R&D. Indeed, it is the Patent Office that was largely res-
ponsible, in 1839, for originating the most significant direct
federal efforts of the 19th century: agricultural research.
By 1860, several states had already established agricultural
colleges; and 1862 saw the establishment of the Agriculture
Department as well as the Land Grant College Act, which pro-
vided funds for agricultural colleges in every state. These
early educational efforts were focused on practical training
far more than on research; but the Hatch Act of 1887 provided
each state with funds specifically for research.
1. See Robert Evenson, "Technical Change in U.S. Agriculture,"
in R.R. Nelson, ed., Technical Change in U.S. Industry; A
Cross-Industry Analysis, New York: Center for Science and
Technology Policy, 1981. [Hereinafter cited as Nelson (1981)]
As noted above, -this companion volume to the present report
contains detailed analyses of technical change in seven
major areas of U.S. industry. The study's conclusions are
summarized more fully below in Chapter III.
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Federal funding of agriculture could be considered
active in the limited sense that such research was seen as
a means for spurring improvement in a particular industrial
rector. Yet, these efforts were entirely passive in the
sense that the federal government did not — and still does
not ~ have a strong influence on the direction of the re-
2
search or the selection of projects.
Another passive government aid to science and techno-
logy was the creation of the National Bureau of Standards. -
Begun in 1901 as the successor to the Office of Weights and
Measures, the NBS before World War II largely confined it-
self to setting standards and conducting research directly
related to standards and measurement.
In the 20th century, the most characteristic influence
of federal action on civilian R&D has been the "spin-off"
effect from non-civilian — usually military — federal
research. A good example of this is the comi.iercial aircraft
incastry, where developments in airframes and (especially)
engines for military aircraft found direct application in
civilian aviation. The National Advisory Committee on Avia-
tion (NACA — the forerunner of present-day NASA) was set up
in 1915 with explicitly military goals — although, until
about 1935, its laboratories provided important empirical
and technological information that was as useful in civilian
4
applications as in military.
2. Evenson, Op. Cit.
3. See Weights and Measures Administration, National Bureau
of Standards Handbook, 82, U.S. Department of Commerce,
1962.
4. David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, "Government Policy
and Innovation in the Commercial Aircraft Industry,
1925-75," in Nelson (1981) ; pjg. Cit.
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This pattern of influence was not unique to aviation;
much the same story can be told about such industries as
computers and semiconductors by merely translating a few
decades forward in time. In other areas, though, indust-
rial development was influenced only negligibly by direct
federal R&D efforts, whether spun-off or otherwise.
In such areas as railroads, automobiles and housing,
the extent and direction of technical change was influenced
solely by indirect federal actions until the 1960s. In the
case of automobiles, for example, federal tax policy and the
subsidization of a massive highway system — not federal R&D •
shaped the modern American car.
It is only after World War II -- and, for the most part,
not until the 1960s — that we begin to find government
involvement in civilian-sector R&D that is both direct and
active.
The period in U.S. history from 1945 through the 1960s
(and beyond) was characterized by a number of generally
agreed-upon attributes. Politically, there was a slowly
decreasing resistance to the enlargement of government and
to its extension into the civilian sphere. Furthermore,
public attitudes toward science and technology were extremely
favorable, with widespread confidence in the ability of those
disciplines to solve problems and produce results. Public
anxiety had other causes; a growing recognition of U.S. pre-
eminence in world affairs, coupled with the sentiments and
intuitions-of the cold war, led to an attitude of "gappism"
that called out in alarm whenever the U.S. was seen to be
"lagging" in aggregate statistics of one kind or another.
See Barbara Katz and Almarin Phillips, "Government
Technological Opportunities, and the Structure of the •
Computer Industry, 1946-61," as well as Richard Levin,
"The Government and Technical Change in the Semiconductor
Industry," in Nelson (1981), Op..Cit.
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It is probably not too surprising that these factors
should have combined to yield programs to use government-
funded R&D as a "control variable" to effect national civi-
lian objectives — notably the prevention or elimination of
a "technology gap" relative to other developed countries.
By 1980, the desirability of such progress was virtually a
given in national science and technology .policy.
This is not to say that this opinion was or is unani-
mous or that its dominance in policy circles cane gradually
and uneventfully. In fact, the premises of science policy
feigning in Washington at the time this study began were the
product of at least three distinct and identifiable periods
of government activism.
i ; The first of these periods came in the early years of
I the Kennedy administration — a time when, in the view of
;nia.ny scholars, the governing attitude in the White House
;was that public policy is no longer a matter of ideology
but of dispassionate technocratic management. The Commerce
Department created the post of assistant secretary for science
and technology; and J. Herbert Hollomon, then head of GE's
Engineering Laboratory, was named to fill it.
Hollomon's major project was to initiate a Civilian
Industrial Technology Program (CIT). The program would have
(a) provided funds for university personnel to work on indus-
trial research; (b) attempted to stimulate industry to under-
take more risky or expensive R&D; (c) developed an Agriculture-
like university-industry extension service; and (d) provided
services for collecting and disseminating technical information.
6. See, e.g., Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 1965,
p. 644.
7. D.S. Greenberg, "Civilian Technology: Concern Over Pace
of Growth Inspires Program for Rese..;.ch and Development
Effort," Science, Vol. 139, February 5, 1963, p. 576.
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The raison d'Sfcre of CIT was the perceived "gap" in
industrial technology, apparently measured not by a compari-
son of technological outputs but the proportion of inputs
devoted to civilian technology relative to other industrial-
Q
ized countries. Hollcmon saw many U.S. industries as "lag-
ging" in the application of science and technology to production,
a view he expressed with what the science press of the day
Q
termed a singular lack of diplomacy. Industry officials,
with the help of labor, quickly succeeded in killing the pro-
gram. Congress eventually approved the "extension service"
part — and then killed even that in 1969.
The idea of an industrial R&D effort lay dormant during
the Johnson years, although spending on non-military R&D
rose as the line agencies of the Great Society channeled
resources into areas like health, education and housing. The
 :. : ;
Nixon administration initially displayed a lack of enthusiasm : ; i
for an industrial technology program; indeed, the incumbent ; ; ' • ;
successor to Hollomon as assistant Commerce secretary resigned;
in quiet despair over the administration's technology efforts.;.^
But, within a matter of months, the winds shifted. l\:' :.'-
Partly be- ~e the economy, overheated by budget deficits and!.!;:' •
monetary inflation during the Vietnam War. was beginning to ::: - : "
8. Ibid. . ' • ; ; ;
9. D.S. Greenberg, "Civilian Technology: Program, to Boost
Industrial Research Heavily Slashed in House," Science
Vol. 140, June 28, 1963, p. 1380.
10. D.S. Creenberg, "Civilian Technology: Opposition in
Congress and Industry Leads vo Major P.eaJignment of
Program," Science, Vol. 143, February 14, 1964, p. 660.
11. Andrew Hamilton, "State Technical Services Act: Congress
Swings the Axe," Science, Vol. 166, December 26, 1968,
p. 1606.
12. John Walsh, "Myron Tribus, Top Science Official, Resigns,'
Science, Vol. 170, December 4, 1970, p. 1065.
turn down, and partly because the imminent end of the
Apollo program was creating unemployment in the science and
engineering community, the Nixon administration, as part
of its economic policy, suddenly became very interested in
fosucrinq industrial technology."
This time, the initiative came not at the assistant-
secretary level but at the level of the White House staff.
Nixon brought in William Magruder — fresh from heading the
administration's ill-fated SST effort -« to organize the
New Technology Opportunities Program (i^ T".j>) ,15 a four-month
executive-branch policy study completed in January, 1972.
As a practical matter, this initatives program got
little further than its predecessor in the 1960s. There was
initially much talk about tax incentives for private R&D;
large increases in federal spending for applied cix'ilian
research; changes in the anti-trust laws; and even a reorgan-
ization on the federal R&D policy and management organization
13. Initially, the administration's position had been that
it would not try to stimulate R&D as a way of reducing
unemployment among technologists, relying instead on
special retraining and information programs. Sec
Philip M. Boffey, "Unemployment: What Nixon Is/Isn't
Doing to Help Jobless Scientists," Science, Vol. 171,
March 12, 1971, p. 985.
14. Nicholas Wade, "Nixon's New Economic Policy: Hints of
: a Resurgence for R&D," Science, Vol. 173, August 27, 1971,
p. 794. On the Now Economic Policy generally, see
Herbert Stein, "Remembering the Fifteenth of August,"
The Wall Street Journal, August 14, 1981.
15. Deborah Shaplcy, "Magruder in the White House: SST Man
Plans New Technology Take Off," Science, Vol. 174,
October 22, 1971, p. 386.
16. See Claude E. Barfield, "High-Tech.jology Package Focuses
on Domestic Needs, U.S. Trade Balance," National Journal,
October 23, 1971, p. 2114; Claude E. Darfield, "High-
Technology Research Program May include Tax and Antitrust
Proposals," National Journal, October 31, 1971, p.2156;
and Deborah Shapley, "Technology Initiatives: Hints on
the Magruder Effort," Science, Vol. 175> January 21, 1972,
P. 279.
There was also considerable effort put into the preparation
of plans for major civilian-oriented R&D programs. But when
the program reached Congress, it contained only modest
increases in spending on goal-di-ected research for social
concerns and a $40 million cooperative program under which
the National Science Foundation and the National Bureau of
Standards would jointly "test incentives to stimulate R&D."
These funds were promptly impounded by the Office of Manage-
18 'inert and Budget (OMB) .
On another level, though, the Magruder effort was a
success. For it signalled the ideological victory within a
Republican administration of the proposition that civilian-
sector R&D is a lever that, in the hands of the government,
can affect the macroeconomic problems of productivity and
international trade. No less a figure than then-Commerce
secretary Maurice Stans testified before Congress to the
administration's faith in this proposition.
The candor with which Stans presented the case is almost
startling. He cited figures — based, evidently, on the neo-
mercantilist analyses of an enterprising Commerce economist
17. Fred H. Zerkel, "White House Shapes Strategic Approach to
R&D," Chemical and Engineering News March 20, 1972, p. 24.
18. Robert Gillette, "Technological Initiatives: NBS Funds in
Holding Pattern," Science, Vol. 179, Jan. 12,1973, p. 163.
19.. Maurice Stans, "Science, Technology and the Economy," State-
ment before the House Subcommittee on Science, Research and
Development, July 27, 1971, reprinted in NBS Technical News
Bulletin, November 1971, p. 270.
20. See Phillip M. Boffey, "Technology and World Trade: Is There
Cause for Al-irm?" Science, Vol. 172, April 2, 1971, p. 37,
and Deborah Shapley, "Technology and Trade Crisis: Salvation
Through a New Policy," Science, Vol. 179, March 2, 1973,
p. 88i.. The concern with a "trade gap" was also voiced in
the popular press. See "Making U.S. Technology More Compe-
titive," Business Week, Jan. 15, 1972, p. 44. For a more
balanced contemporary view, see Harvey Brooks, "What's
Happening to the U.S. Lead in Technology?" Harvard Business
Review, Vol. 50, No. 3, May-June 1972, p. 110.
linking an unfavorable trade balance with inadequate spend-
ing on civilian R&D. Then, listing fill the other factors
conventionally thought to govern a nation's trade position —
inflation, exchange rates, tariffs, quotas, etc. — Stans
argued that the only variable the government could really
control is "technological development" (read: civilian R&D) .
"(T)he major clement which we can influence decisively for
the long-run," he told the House Science, Research and
Development Subcommittee, "is the level of technological
development. It may be our only hope of maintaining a
future trade position adequate to support our balance of
payments in the years to come.'"' The only dissent seemed
to come from that perennial spoil-sport, OMB.22
Watergate and its aftermath put the question of civilian
R&D initiatives on the back burner at top administrative -: .
levels. Only at the lower echelons of the civilian agencies
did the pot continue to simmer. IN ;
In May, 1978, President Carter called for a domestic; ::
policy review (DPR) on innovation. This review, completed': ;
in 1979 under the direction of Jordan Baruch, the most recent
assistant Commerce secretary for science and technology, ^ pro-
duced a more specific and more ambitious set of proposals ;
thar did its predecessors. Analyzing this third initiative'
and its proposals is the topic of Chapter IV below. :; ; . ' :
21. Stans, Op. Crt.
22. Wade (August 27, 1971), O£. Cjjb. p. 795.
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B. Functions and Role of Industrial Research.
In order tt understand the significance of the Carter
initiatives, though, more than a historical background is
necessary. One also needs a background on the principles
and procedures by which science and technology relate to
civilian objectives. In particular, one needs to know some-
23thing about industrial research and how it operates.
The activity in society likely to be most important to
an effective federal role in civilian-sector R&D is industrial
research itself. The industrial research sector is the
principal instrument for integrating science and technology
into the U.S. industrial system, which in turn is the instru-
ment by which the resulting products, processes and services
are; introduced into the economy.
: Thus, the effectiveness of federal efforts intended to
support civiliaa-soctor R&D depends very critically on inter-
actions with industrial research. It is at the loo.ut a vital
part of the transfer process between any federal program and
the ultimate user, and it can be a major source of inputs and
assistance for such programs.
The evaluation of past federal actions and suggestions
for future guidelines call for some comprehension of the
principal functions of industrial research and how these are
carried out. Without in any way attempting to describe the
history of industrial research, this section will set forth
simply those specific aspects which must be understood and
considered in the development and implementation of a national
23. For a fuller treatment in a slightly different context,
see Herbert I. Fusfeid, Perspectives on U.S. Industrial
Innovation, New York: Center for Science and Technology
Policy, January, 1981. This publication also contains
an annotated bibliography by Theodore W. Schlie, of
which see especially pp. 7-13.
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science policy. This rests to some extent on understanding
the role of the private sector itself.'
The characteristics of the private sector relevant to
our discussion are:
1. It decentralizes decision-making. Each individual
firm makes decisions on the allocation of those
resources within its control.
2. Each firm trios to allocate its resources so as
to produce maximum return on investment consistent
with long-term growth and stability.
3. The profit motive (or profit constraint) creates
an internal pressure within each firm to maintain
a proper balance among its resources.
Now, consider the role and characteristics of industrial
research in this environment. It is not an independent acti-
vity, set apart, feeding occasional ideas and technical
breakthroughs along a one-way communication link to an eager
and waiting production line. It is, and must be, very much
a part of the whole industrial system. Thus, the firm has
to make plans for:
1. Technical programs and/or areas relevant to the
business strategy of the firm;
2 The level of technical effort compatible with
the needs and abilities of the firm; and
3. Mechanisms for conversion to use of successful
R&D programs.
The key to all these activities is balance. This is
both qualitative, as in the case of business strategy and
management capabilities, and quantitative, as in the use of
available funds and manpower in light of probable return.
The process by which one arrives at these judgments must con-
sider the cost and technical feasibility of adapting successful
R&D to workable manufacturing processes using economically
available materials to give satisfactory: performance in use.
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There are, in short, certain disciplines that, make up
industrial research. This is why otherwise identical
technical projects concerned with (say) removing sulphur
from coal would have fundamentally different attributes when
conducted by an industry, a university, or a government
environment. Among these attributes are:
1. Consideration of the system which will be used
to develop manufacturing processes and arrange
distribution.
2. Consideration of all technical characteristics
of a final product or process as defined by the
needs and constraints of the user.
3. Consideration of the interactions among market
demands, cost, investment, and technical perfor-
mance of the product or process.
: 4. Consideraton of perceived options to meet the
broad needs of the potential user with regard
to a specific mission-oriented objective, either
through competitive technical approaches, substi-
tutes, or non-technical approaches (e.g., use of
economic incentives or penalties).
The industrial research community, particularly the
research manager, is the bridge between science and the user
and must account for the transfer process between the two.
The research manager is aware that the function of R&D is
to provide options — for solutions to problems or for
investments — that are acceptable economically to society.
The R&D activities are integrated with a complete manufactur-
ing and distribution system, and all parts of the system are
involved in the earliest planning and the ultimate use.
These are, of course, precisely the approaches required
to answer the questions raised regarding an active science
policy in the civilian sector: how to decide on priorities
among technical programs and how to provide for effective
transfer. The mechanisms for both reside within industrial
research. The problem is how to couple this know-how with
government programs.
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Those federal policies that recognize and make use
of the characteristics of industrial research will be most
likely to improve the effectiveness of civilian-sector R&D.
Those that do not, either through lack of understanding of
those mechanisms or because of the pressure of other national
objectives, will lower this effectiveness.
These comments are valid for the range of federal
interactions with the private sector in the. R&D field.
These include the direct efforts where federal funding may
support Rj.0 conducted within industry, or where some form
of cooperative efforts between government and industry is
the mechanism. It obviously holds for such indirect effort
as tax incentives. In any instance, the unique aspect of
industrial research is the integration of the R&D organization
with the other resources ot" each individual corporation, not
simply the R&D capability as an isolated resource.
This summary of the nature of industrial research can
be made more complete for the purposes of this study by add-
ing a few comments about specific operating characteristics.
The most important feature is that each industry iz unique
with regard to such factors as:
* Whether competition is atomistic or rivalrous;
'* The sizes and size-distribution of firms;
* The ease of entry for new firms;
* The R&D policies of the firms;
* . The nature of the customers and their innovative
':" behavior;
* The proprietary characteristics of the knowledge
produced by R&D in the industry; and
* The nature and extent of government regulation.
There are others. What comes through sharply in this list
is that the reaction of industry to an,y federal effort in
R&D will be different for each industry —indeed for each
company.
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Thus, there is considerable variation among industries
in the linkages with, and dependence upon, outside sources
of technical change. These diverse links include coopera-
tive plans with universities, joint ventures with other
companies, liaison activities with technical organizations
internationally.
In the broadest sense, then, there are several princi-
ples concerning federal support of civilian-sector R&D that
emerge from considerations of industrial research:
* First, thi* effectiveness of a program will be
related to the extent of "tailoring" to the
characteristics of the industry or industries
affected.
* Second, there must be a clear appreciation of
the strategic planning taking place in each
industry for the integration of technical change
in its economic growth.
* Third, the value of direct vs. indirect federal
actions is dependent upon each industry.
C. R&D and Productivity Growth, and the Roles of Public
R&D Funding. •
Economic analyses sometimes lead, and sometimes lag,
policy deliberations. In the case of government policy toward
industrial innovation, economic analysis ran ahead of general
policy discussions.
During the 1960s, th3re was Considerable support within
the professional economic community for the proposition that
government ought to play an active role in industrial innova-
tion. That support rested on two separate lines of analysis.
First, several studies during the 195.0s led economists to
believe that technological advance accounted for. the.lion's
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share of the high productivity growth then being experi-
enced, and that research and development expenditures were
an important source of technological advance. Second, a
variety of theoretical arguments suggested that, in general,
profit maximizing activity by business firms operating in
competitive markets leads to a level of spending less than
the "social optimum."
In recent years, economists have learned that the
relationships between R&D and productivity growth — and
the kinds of roles that government fruitfully can play in
industrial innovation — are more subtle and complex than
these earlier formulations had indicated. But the development
of these earlier theories strongly influenced the direction
of policy; and the intellectual history of those analyses is
directly relevant to understanding the history of government
' 24 •• -:'-:- • • -policy toward civilian-sector R&D. :; .
There has been a long tradition in economics of research
on productivity growth. Adam Smith was interested in that
topic, and he assigned much of the credit for the rapid pro-
ductivity growth then occurring in England to what now would
be called industrial innovation. He noted several sources ;
of innovation, including what we would now call "learning: ::
curves," and he recognized the background role of basic ' *
science. Many economists since Smith have speculated on ;
24. For a comprehensive review of earlier scholarly thinking
on R&D and innovation, see Richard R. Nelson, Merton Peck,
and Edward Kalachck, Technology, Economic Growth and
Public Policy, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1967. For a more recent viewpoint (by one
of the same authors) on the economics of innovation and
R&D, see Nelson and Sidney Winter, "In Search of a Use-
ful Theory of Innovation," Research Policy, Vol. 6,
(1977) , p. .36. :
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the sources of productivity growth and industrial innovation.
In the 1950s, economists at the National Bureau of Economic
Research began systematic studies to identify the sources
of experienced productivity growth. As a result of their
work (and that of Robert Solow and Edward Denison) economists,
by 1960, were in accord that only a small fraction of the
growth of output per worker experienced in the United States
could be attributed simply-to increases in machinery or other
materie.: inputs per worker. Most of the productivity advance
showed up as a disembodied increase in the capability to pro-
duce goods and services from given inputs; the country's
economists associated this increase with technological
advance. During the early and middle 1960s, many scholars
noted that the technological advance, measured as an increase
of the productivity of all inputs, seemed to have accelerated
significantly in the post-war years. It was recognized that
R&D spending had increased greatly as well, and many scholars
drew the obvious connections.
i At roughly the same time, a number of scholars were
inquiring into the determinants of R&D spending by business
firms and exploring, within the context of various models,
whether the magnitude and allocation of R&D spending most
profitable for business firms is also "optimal" from a social
point of view. The results of these inquiries led economists
to argue that a more active government role in stimulating
industrial R&D would be in the social interest. There were
several arguments in the economists' quiver. First, it was
argued, R&D expenditures often yield "externalities": the
returns to one firm's R&D flow in part to other parties and
are therefore only partially capturable by the firm that
bears the R&D expense. A second argument was that efforts
to achieve significant technological breakthroughs inevitably
involve considerable uncertainty; when uncertainties are very
large, business investment is likely to be deterred even if
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the expected gain is reasonably high. Both of these argu-
ments suggested that, when judged from a social point of
view, private investment in R&D is necessarily insufficient;
and this pointed toward federal policies to supplement
private R&D spending, it seemed plausible that federal funds
should go into the kinds of R&D and the industries where the
externalities and uncertainties were greatest. In addition,
many economists were arguing, when industry structure is
fragmented, the firms tend to be too small to mount an effi-
cient R&D effort. Special federal programs for such indust-
ries ought to be considered.
These theoretical arguments were supported by a few
quantitative studies of the social returns to particular
R&D investments. These studies showed such returns to be
very high. Studies of federal R&D support, particularly in
agriculture, showed past government involvements to have been
excellent social investments.
Taken together, the economists' findings about the
important role of technological advance in economic growth
and their arguments about a tendency of private business
firms to under-fund R£,D provided strong intellectual support
for those within -- and outside — government who believed in
a more active federal presence. The economists' arguments
were presented in the 1962 annual Economic Report of the
President in support of the then-developing civilian industrial
technology program (CIT) mentioned earlier. They have also
been used, in one way or another, in all later discussions
about the appropriate government role.
Economists now understand that the relationships between
S&D spending and productivity growth are.more complicated
than they earlier believed. During both the Magruder exercise,
and the more recent Domestic Policy Review on innovation,25
25. Cf. Chapter II.A. above.
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the erosion in the American technological lead was a topic
of considerable concern. Government stimulus of R&D was
put forth as a means to halt the relative decline. However,
a number of recent studies have shown that the differences
among the industrialized nations in their rates of producti-
vity growth are not well correlated with their R&D spending,
either in volume or as a function of GNP. Indeed, the two
countries which in the 1950s and early 1960s had the highest
ratio of R&D to GNP — the United Statss and Great Britain —
experienced among the lowest productivity growth rates. It
has been noted that both the U.S. and Britain allocated an
unusually large share of their R&D to defense purposes. In
any case, productivity growth among nations has been much
better correlated with physical investment as a fraction of
GNP than with R&D as a fraction of GNP, whether defense R&D
is counted or not. ;i ;
Once one recognizes the relative ease with which . s;
technological knowledge flows across national boundaries, Hr
this conclusion should not be particularly surprising. f\. '•
Certainly in the 1950s and 1960s, the European countries I ^  ••
and Japan were benefiting greatly from their ability to M i!
adopt technology developed or employed earlier in the United I ll:l I
States. There is evidence (for example in the form of patentf;^
licensing statistics) that, as technological levels among ; ; • : : .
countries have come closer together in the 1970s, the United
 :i ' • ' '
States is beginning to benefit from technology developed in I : - ' ' .
other countries.
This suggests a more subtle connection between a
country's overall R&D effort and its relative productivity
growth performance. So long as their physical investment
rates are substantial, countries with productivity levels
and technologies well below the frontier can probably achieve
rapid productivity growth even if their R&D spending is modest.
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A country's R&D effort becomes more important when it is
close to or striving toward the frontier, or trying to hold
a position at the frontier. For countries in this position,
a strong R&D effort is necessary for rapid productivity
growth, even though it may not be sufficient.
Just as differences in countrie^' productivity growtn
rates have not been strongly correlated with differences in
:their R&D spending, variations in a country's economic
:growth rate over time are not well associated with variations
iin its overall R&D spending rate. In particular, it is
unlikely that the worsened productivity growth experienced
;in most countries after 1973 was caused by a fall in their
R&D spending. What .is true is that the surge of productivity
:growth that the United States, Western Europe, and Japan
enjoyed during the 1960s came at a time whan, by historical
'standards, all of these countries were investing heavily in
;;R&D. But the slowdown of productivity growth since 1973 has
ibeen ubiquitous.' Only in the United States and France was
:the productivity growth deceleration foreshadowed by any
islowdown in R&D expenditure. And in those countries, the
bulk of that R&D decline has been in government R&D spending
.on defense and space — not in industrial R&D spending on
industrial innovation. .
Again, a more subtle analysis seems called for. Even
for a country close to the frontiers of technology, it will
take time before variations in R&D spending affect productivity
growth; and it matters what kind of R&D spending is advancing
or declining. Nonetheless, it probably is true that a country
cannot long stay at the forefront if it allows the level of
its industrial R&D focused on new products and processes con-
tinually to erode.
The connections between R&D spending and productivity
growth show up more sharply when one considers the differences
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in measured rates of productivity growth and technical
advance among sectors and industries. Almost invariably,
industries experiencing rapid productivity growth either
spend a considerable amount themselves on R&D or have equip-
ment or material suppliers who spend a considerable amount
on R&D. Those who spend little themselves on R&D, and who
are not fortunate enough to have technologically progressive
suppliers, have experienced very slow productivity growth.
The question of why there are such great differences across
industries and sectors in the R&D attention they are attract-
ing is interesting, important, and at present not well
answered. One possible answer is that R&D on the technologies
in some industries is not very fruitful, and the lack of R&D
attention simply reflects this. Another possible answer,
consistent with the theoretical arguments that private firms
spend too little on R&D, is that a variety of institutional
factors render R&D privately unprofitable in circumstances j
in which it would be socially fruitful. And no government
 :.
policies have yet aaen devised to remedy the situation. ;
The question is particularly germane to this report, ;:
since government programs in support of civilian applied R&D .:
inevitably will.-- and should -- differ from Factor to sector.:;
What makes sense for agriculture may make little sense for 'si
Pharmaceuticals. Government policies to stimulate industrial
innovation in general can make use of across-the-board instru-
ments like the new tax credit for (increments to) R&D spending:
or various mechanisms to facilitate fruitful university-
industry interaction. Support of academic basic research
conducted at universities is also a general-purpose tocl, oven
though its effects (as -that of tax credits) ure likely to
vary significantly from industry to industry. When the focus
is on direct support of R&D aimed at advancing technological
understanding or capability, it is essential to recognize
that particular programs inevitably will be targeted on parti-
cular industries or industry groups. What is appropriate for
one industry may not be for another.
What are the appropriate roles for the federal govern-
ment in stimulating and guiding applied R&D spending? In
particular,,what kind of R&D should the federal government
itself finance? What industries and technologies especially
warrant government R&D support? Economists once thought they
knew the answers to these questions. But, as economists
began to recognize more clearly the complexities of the rela-
tionships between R&D spending and productivity growth, the
simple arguments that had once seemed to provide support and
guidance for an active federal role in civilian-sector R&D
began suddenly to unravel. The situation is now recognized
to be more complicated — and directions for policy to be
more uncertain.
In the first place, when a competitive firm's inventions
are protected to some degree by prtents or secrecy, there are
incentives for the firm to do R&D that, in effect, duplicates
or "invents around" already available technology. Although
"externalities" may lead firms to underinvest in R&D from a
social point of view, these incentives to duplicate or "invent
around" pull in the opposite direction. While it is still
clear that the allocation of R&D resources generated in a
competitive industry by profit incentives may not be "socially
optimal," the problem is not easily characterized in terms of
under-spending. Also, it is not obvious what, if anything,
federal policy can do to improve the allocation of R&D spend-
ing, particularly when firms are reluctant to disclose their
own R&D programs to public view.
Similarly, the implications of that considerable uncer-
tainty which attends endeavors to advance a technology signi-
ficantly now are understood to be far more complex and subtle
than was once thought. Under conditions of technological
uncertainty, the appropriate strategy from a social point of
view would appear to involve the exploration of a number of
different, alternatives, rather than a "big push" in one
direction or another. The aborted federal attempt to fund
development of a supersonic transport illustrates the pro-
blem in paradigmatic fashion.
The argument that a federal role is particularly war-
ranted in industries where firms are small also began to
come apart. It was noticed that in some industries, technical
progress was slow despite the fact that firms were large, and
in some industries where technological progress was rapid,
new and small firms were important sources of the key inven-
tions. The experience with Operation Breakthrough vividly
illustrated the dangers of applying the agriculture model
indiscriminately. Even if the experience of agricultural
policy is applicable to other industries with a similar,
"fragmented" structure, the necessary institutional arrange-
ments remain complex and hard-to-put-together in a political
setting. . .
At .'•.he same time, analysts have also come more fully
to realize that government-supported R&D associated with
procurement, and government-funded research undertaken at
universities but tailored to particular social needs or
technologies, have contributed to civilian innovation in a
number of industries. In considering government R&D support
to spur industrial innovation, it may be a mistake not to
consider very carefully procurement-related R&D and support
of R&D at universities. The federal government has a choice
about whether and the extent to which it funds R&D on the
products it procures. Similarly, there is considerable room
for discretion regarding the range of research topics that
the government can support in a university setting with the
research results treated as non-proprietary'.
These considerations suggest some guidelines- for the role
of the federal government. We think it apparent that the R&D
allocation generated by market incentives is not necessarily
"optimal." But federal policies to improve that allocation
will have to be subtle, and formal theoretical reasoning
does not take us very far toward understanding which kinds
of policies will work. Thus, the question of appropriate
federal policies is largely an empirical one, not a theore-
tical one. The research we have undertaken on the history
of federal involvement in seven American industries —
reported below in Chapter III — and on recent federal
technical initiatives in the civilian sector -- discussed
in Chapter IV — is a start on such empirical research.
D. Perceptions of Government Action: Inputs from
Executives in Government.and Industry.
 :
If, as we have suggested, understanding the process i:.
of technical change in industry -- and the involvement of ;i j
government in that process — is a rather subtle and complex
institutional problem, then it becomes clear that any ]:
federal efforts in the service of civilian technology must:
recognize the institutional problem and work within its Ji
constraints. ; .-::
In particular, the message of the foregcing sections,
is in large part that effective government R£D efforts in ;
the civilian sector must understand and utilize effectively [
the knowledge and incentives of private industry. Further-
more, as history suggests, the political success of such
a program depends crucially upon the development and main-
tenance of a constituency for its support.
This immediately implies that successful federal involve-
ment in civilian R&D requires a non-confrontational interactiof
with industry -- that government support depends for its
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effectiveness on the understanding, cooperation, and
involvement of the industrial research esacutives and
senior government officials who must set policies and make
decisions on technical programs.
With this in mind, it seeme-i to us essential to examine
the views of decision-maker — both in industry and in govern-
ment — who have been involved in public-private interactions
in civilian-sector R&D. And an important aspect of this
study thus has been to engage such individuals in discussion
about the government role in civilian-sector R&D; about
specific program initiatives; and about specific mechanisms
for ^ implementing government objectives. These discussions
occurred partly in throe workshops of abouv 20 to 25 people
each, and partly in individual discussions. There were two
principal purposes served. ..
U •; First, these key personnel provided critical perspec-
tives concerning the subjects examined in this study. These
value-judgments and anecdotal experiences were helpful in
the task of extracting lessons from the material assembled,
and were undoubtedly responsible in large part for the gen-
erally pragmatic tone reflected throughout this report.
Second, the commentaries and perceptions of senior
executives provided an important base for developing the
general themes summarized in Chapter V and for suggesting
the criteria to guide future policy actions. The accompanying
industry studies, the recent government initiatives, and
the historical evolution of public- and private-sector R&D
offer a large number of specific examples of good and bad
interactions; but the selection of simply stated criteria
*
that might serve as a mere general guide was aided by the
experienced judgments we received.
Many of these inputs have already been woven into the
analyses of the preceding chapters, and also in Chapters III
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and IV. There are some themes present in the perceptions
of those interviewed, however, that should be emphasized by
presenting them here as.general lines of thought, without
thinking of them only in the context of a particular
industry or program.
One somewhat unexpected observation was the general
agreement between government and industry executives on
major approaches to government-industry interactions. The
simple concept that effective government involvement in
civilian-sector R&D called for private-sector linkages in
planning, in conducting R&D, and in converting results to
use emerged from both sectors. The need for guidance based
on market considerations was axiomatic to all with regard
to technology that could lead to products and processes
integrated into the civilian economy.
There was equal comparability in discussions as to
what factors could justify government activity in civilian-
sector R&D -- questions of important public interest,
disaggregated industry structure, general needs for support-
ing the technical infrastructure. This should not imply
complete agreement, but remarkably similar listings emerged
from government and industry representatives.
Clearly, our discussions were with operating executives
of both sides, not ideologues. These were thoughtful people
who had spent their professional careers in addressing the
question of generating and using technical change. The
similarity seemed to override the adversary tendency one
often expects to encounter in government-industry dialogues
on economic or social questions.
Thus, industry representatives provided examples for
constructive government activities, not arguments for a
complete withdrawal from government intervention. Their
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views mirrored to a lar^e extent the conclusions of the
economic histories described in II C (above). There was a
general consensus on these broad points:
* The government should fund basic scientific
research and support generic technologies.
* The government should stay out of applied
research whenever it is not itself the final
customer for the products involved.
* Cooperative research among companies — or
among companies and government — is possible
in a rivalrous industry only on matters
"peripheral" to the industry's main concerns.
* The government should support scientific and
technical infrastructure — facilities, teaching,
and especially manpower training.
In a similar manner, government representatives
suggested a need for the sorts of interactions that have
long been advocated by industry. Among these are:
* Involvement of industry perssonel to help set
priorities and to inform planning based upon
market developments and general business plans.
* Cooperation with active industry R&D programs
in relevant areas.
* Desirability of exclusive licensing for
optimum exploitation of government-supported
R&D when appropriate.
* Exposure to industry needs in underlying
scientific and eingineering fields.
An important substantive issue surrounds the fact
that, historically, government R&D activity evolved from
strictly public-sector areas. This set certain precedents
for contract instruments, accountability of funds, and dis-
tinctions between grants and contracts. The general — and
perhaps unfortunate — thrust has been to treat federal
funding of even civilian-sector R&D as "procurement" rather
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than as assistance. 26
It is not critical to review the details of these
issues here. Major reviews have been carried out by OTA and
27OMB, among others. The important point to note is that
the issues are being approached by government agencies with
the intent of improving the conduct and transfer of R&D,
and to stimulate interactions with the private sector.
Thus, a first optimistic conclusion from these inputs
is that, at a very broad level, responsible personnel in the
public and private sectors have a similar appreciation of
the factors entering into the process of technical change
in industry. This is not a trivial asset in creating a
future system for the effective use of our total technical
resources.
The allocation of federal R&D resources intended to
benefit the civilian sector appears to require at least
two conditions: support within industry and understanding
within government. Doth rely upon a corps of senior execu-
tives who approach the issues in a professional and rational
manner. The existence of these individuals in government
and industry is an important basis for improved effectiveness
in future activities.
26. This view is also expressed in a report by the Office
of Technology Assessment, Applications of R&D,
Washington, D.C., June, 1978.
27. The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977
mandated a comprehensive two-year program of federal
assistance to be conducted by the 'jffice of Management
and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy. For
part of this review see OMB, Toward a Uniform Procure-
ment System, Washington, D.C., July, 1980.
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III. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND TECHNICAL CHANGE; LESSONS
FROM HISTORY.
A. Analyzing a Complete Historical Record.
This chapter is an attempt to summarize and interpret
the results of this study's principal analytic project:
historical case studies of technical change in seven major
industrial sectors. The studies themselves, along with a
more detailed analysis, are available separately as the
second volume of this report. The studies describe — in
some cases in considerable detail — what the most important
government policies have been, the reasons ;or those policies,
and (albeit often in qualitative terms) how those policies
have influenced technological change. .
Most analytic attempts at understanding the implications
of government involvement in technical change —including
those prefatory to launching new government programs to stim-
ulate such technical change in industry -- have tried to
begin de novo. -Sometimes they have attached themselves to
one .or another, economic theory relating R&D to economic growth;
often they, have looked about for industries potentially in
Th2 case studies and their authors are: agriculture
(Robert Evenson); automobiles (Lawrence J. White);
coranercial aviation (David Mcwery and Nathan Rosenberg);
computers (Barbara Katz and. Almarin Phillips); housing
v'.Tohn Quigley) ; Pharmaceuticals (Henry Grabowski and
John Vernon); and semiconductors (Richard Levin).
Richard.R. Nelson, .ed., Technical Change in U.S.
Industry: A Cross-Industry Analysis, New York:
Center for Science and Technology Policy, 1981.
(Forthcoming, in 1982 .from Per'gamon Press.)
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need of a stimulus to innovation. But few studies have
recognized that government involvement in industrial innova-
tion is a process with a long history, one rich in clues for
those who seek the path of successful government policy.
The imperatives of theory and history are always at
odds. Theory simplifies; history complicates. But a theory
disciplined by history is likely to be a robust one, one
attentive to idiosyncrasy and detail. The U.S. policy exper-
ience in industrial innovation — as captured in our seven
industrial studies — reveals a good deal of complex detail
demanding our attention.
1. A Brief Review.
:;.; From the beginnings of the industry, the federal govern-
ment has been a major stimulator and support of technological
;advance in aircraft. Military procurement has, at virtually
:all times, accounted for a significant fraction of total sales
:of the industry. Direct government support of R&D has taken
•several forms. During the heyday of NACA, government funds
supported R&D and testing relating to aircraft in general;
during this time the generic aspects of military and commer-
cial technologies were relatively undifferentiated, and
advances in understanding or design principles relevant to
one usually wuri? relevant to the other as we'll. Of course, • jj
the government funded R&D on airframes and components intended ::
for specific.military needs, although in many cases the com-
panies invested their own funds in hopes of winning a procure-
ment contract. Since World War II, government R&D monies
have gone largely into work with specific military applications
in mind. It has turned out that a good portion of military
technology con'tinues also to be applicable to civilian aviation,
although recently these technologies have been drawing apart.
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The post-war era was also marked by a government attempt
to instigate and support the development of a commercial
supersonic transport — an experience that ended as an
expensive abort. CAB regulation of the airlines, and the
constraints on vertical integration imposed by the Airmail
Act of 1934, also have been important influences on the
way civil aircraft technology has evolved.
There has also been a strong military, and space,
interest in computer and semi-conductor technology. In
'• •
semi-conductors, most of the early work that laid the found-
ations for the industry was privately financed. Government
• . •
R&D funding came later. By contrast, much of the early
. • :
exploratory research on computers was done under government
I contracts. Government procurement accounted for a large
;percentage of the sales of both industries in the early days.
iWhile, as the industries began to tap commercial markets,
:government procurement and R&D funding came to play smaller
• . . . .
;rol(?s, the government market continues to be significant in
^both industries. Public monies have continued to support
advanced education and university-based research relevant
to these industries. Anti-trust considerations have played
an important role in the evolution of both industries. Had
Boll Laboratories and Western Electric gone into commercial
production of semi-conductors, the industry likely would
have taken on a shape very different than it did. Anti-trust
controversy seems to swirl continuously around IBM because
of the dominant position it has achieved in the commercial
computer market.
For many years, public funds have supported applied
and basic research, higher education, and extension services
for agriculture. Unlike the stiuation in the three industries
mentioned above, in the case of agriculture there has been no
major public procurement interest. However, the farmers of
-36-
f^gg^ ^^  .,
the United States have formed a strong political constitu-
ency demanding., and to some extent guiding, government R&D
support. The public R&D system has been operated largely
through the agricultural colleges and experimentation sta-
.tions of the state universities.. Decision-making in R£D
allocation has been largely decentralized to the individual
stations, which depend on their state legislatures for a
hefty portion of their funding.
In Pharmaceuticals, as in agriculture, significant
federal monies have gone into basic research, and into the
establishment and maintenance of programs to train scien-
tists. However, federal funds fcr pharmaceutical applied
research and development have been fenced into the are of
"orphan drugs" for which the commercial market is likely to
be small. It is apparent that there exists a strong political
constituency for basic research funding; at the same time,
there are strong political constraints against significant
federal encroachment into the proprietary domains staked
out by the pharmaceutical companies. Pharmaceuticals is
.also an industry marked by a complicated regulatory regime
that affects the cost of R&D significantly.
The automobile and residential construction industries,
have-experienced neither significant federal procurement nor
much federal R&D support for either basic or applied work.
Regulatory regimes, however, have strongly influenced techno-
logical advance in both sectors. Both sectors have seen
federal attempts to launch an R&D support program. But poli-
tical support for these has been weak; and where programs
were initiated they were not sustained.
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2. The Analytic Problem.
How can lessons be drawn from the rich experience
described in the case studies and from other studies?
In principle, we want to draw up a matrix. The rows would
delineate various policy instruments; the columns would
enumerate various industry characteristics; and the entries
would measure the feasibility and effectiveness of a policy
under a particular set of industry characteristics.
The task, so defined, remains impossible. Simply classi-
fying the policies and the relevant industry characteristics
is a challenging task; tracing cause-and-effect relationships
is extraordinarily difficult.
In general, a wide variety of policies have impinged on
each economic sector and each policy has been complex and
changing ovar time. In both aviation and agriculture, govern-
ment funds have gone into support of applied R&D; but the
programs and the objectives are very different in these two
cases. Regulation has meant different things in automobiles
and in Pharmaceuticals. And there is no obvious "list" of
policy instruments one can think of to define the rows of the
matrix. Indeed, simply describing and broadly characterizing
the various government policies employed is itself a compli- I
cated and worthwhile research endeavor. ;
What are the industry characteristics that determine J
the feasibility and likely effectiveness of various policy {
instruments (assuming these can be well described)? Why
has major government R&D support proved feasible and effective
in aviation, but not in residential construction? The ques-
tion suggests that one important industry characteristic is
the presence or absence of a well-defined procurement interest.
Perhaps so; but government R&D support has been feasible and
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effective in agriculture. What differentiates agriculture
from housing? Simply identifying the key industry character-
istics that seem to explain these differences is a challeng-
ing analytical task.
Even if we could lay out the rows and columns in an
objective manner, cause-and-effeet relationships are not
easy to di"scern; technological progress in an industry might
be fast or slow and take the particular directions that it
did for any of a wide variety of reasons. Given the current
:state of knowledge, it is not possible to estimate a policy's
effect with any precision. To what extent did public JR&D
money simply replace private R&D monies in the early days of
•the computer industry? In aviation? Has public R&D support
•really made a difference lately in semi-conductors? To what
^extent has regulation deterred pharmaceutical innovation?
These are very difficult questions.
: In short, it is very hard to tease out .from the histor-
ical record clear-cut lessons that are applicable to future
policy decisions. But let's try anyway.
Much of what follows will obviously be judgmental. We
will be presenting, in effect, a set of hypotheses about the
kinds of policies that are feasible and effective in various
contexts. While we believe they are consistent with the his-
torical record as revealed in the case studies — and with
other evidence -- this theory, like any theory that fits a
'fragment of evidence, may prove quite wrong in a number of
places or even .in a broad scope.
We are interested ultimately in understanding the
sources of variation. Different policies have been applied
in different industries. Some have been smashing successes;
others have been ineffective or worse. However, in order to
sort out the characteristics, reasons for, and effects of
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variation, it is important to get hold of the conunon elements.
There are several general characteristics of technological
advance that are apparent in all the case studies. One is
the apparent inherent uncertainty .involved in technological
advance. A second is the central, but often myopic and
strongly context-dependent, role of producers and consumers
in the generation and screening of technological advance.
The third is the important role played by nori-rnrket elements
(as well as market ones) in the institutional structure influ-
encing technological advance.
All of the case studies reveal that technological ad-
vance involves considerable uncertainty. When a person or
organization begins the quest for a new product or a process,
it is never clear exactly what the precise outcome will be.
Design configurations and solutions take shape only gradually;
and the ultimate success — or failure — of the quest is
revealed only after the fact. The uncertainties take on a
somewhat different form in each technology. Thus Grabowski
and Vernon describe the hunt for a new pharmaceutical as,
literally, a search. Katz and Phillips discuss the consider-
able uncertainty during the 1950s regarding which new techno-
logy was going to replace the old vacuum tube in computer
design. Nowery and Rosenberg point out that, in the design
of civil aircraft, theoretical calculations resolve only a ;
small portion of the uncertainties. Some of the semi- ;;
conductor companies placed their bets heavily on integrated ;;
circuits; others hung back. .
Technological uncertainties are compounded by market
uncertainties -- which future technologies will be useful,
and which will be bought at a profitable volume and price?
Just as different individuals and R&D organizations lay their
bets differently about which technological paths are the most
promising, so th?y tend to differ in their assessment of the
market. A nunbcr of compani.es that developed stro.ig tech-
nological capabilities for the design of computers failed to
anticipate a large business market. IBM made a bet that
such a market existed at the same time that it acquired the
technological capabilities to cover the bet. The American
automobile companies had little reason to believe that con-
sumer denand would swing sharply towards smaller more fuel
efficient vehicles, brt it did.
Thr.r, , while the details differ from industry to
industry, in none of the cases do R&D and follow-on techno-
logical work appear to be activities that are "plannable"
in any neat and tidy sense. The uncertainties seem to be
innate. Fro.n a social point of view, effective pursuit f
technological advance seems to call for the exploration of
a wide variety of alternatives and the selective screening
of these after their characteristics hava been better -'•"-
revealed -- a process that seems wasteful with the wonderful
vision of hindsight. As the supersonic transport case indi-
cates, however, hindsight may be much clearer than foresight.
All of the case studies also reveal the central role of
the producer-provider (usually private enterprise) or the
demander-user (who may be private or public) in che generating
and screening of technological advances. The producer.- and
the user, each have certain informational and motivational
advantages over other parties. Producers live with the pre-
vailing process and product technology, and know things abouir
it — its strengths, its weaknesses, certain potentialities
for change — that people and organiza* ~ons without that ex-
perience cannot know. Users have siirilar special knowledge
about the products and services they employ. It is natural,
and essential, that this special knowledge and immediate
motivation for improvement play a central role in inducing
and guiding the innovation process. Moreover, in a market
setting it is users who ultimately will determine whether
a product will be demanded, and producers whether it will
be produced and how; .
This said, it should be recognized that the vision may
be narrow, and that motivation is very context-dependent.
Both the computer and semi-conductor case studies reveal
companies reluctant to move away from technologies with
which they were familiar to try radically different ones.
In the semi-conductor case, it is interesting that new com-
panies, not the old tube producers, were the key innovators.
Similarly, user-consumers, like producers, fall into comfor-
table habits. Had IBM waited for potential users of business
computers to articulate a.clear-cut demand for them before
deciding that a market likely existed, the advent of the
computer age would have been significantly delayed.
The. motivation of the producer and user is strongly
.influenced by the details of the technologies involved, and
by the particular institutional and legal setting. There
is little gain for a for-profit seed vendor to develop better
self^propagating seeds. (It does pay the seed vendor to
develop better hybrid seeds since the farmer has to go back
to the source each year; he cannot create next year's seeds
from this year's plants.) It was a delicate, and not inevi-
table, legal decision that ruled that antibiotics, although
natural substances, were patehtable. while patents don't
carry much force in the semi-conductor industry, and innova-
tions, are quickly imitated, the advantages of a head-start
are still significant enough that firms have motive to innovate..
Government regulation, much more than expressed consumer demand,
has pulled innovation towards safer and less environmentally
harmful automobile designs. CAB regulation, in the form pf
constraints .on air fares, tilted airline competition toward
providing more attractive service, and stimulated the market
for faster and more comfortable planes. It was a governmental
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market, not a private market, that made it profitable for
Texas Instruments and IBM to invest in semi-conductor and
computer R&D. Both building codes and fluctuations in the
demand for housing signi-icantly dampen incentives for
innovation in building construction.
In sum, while producers and consumers play central
roles in the innovation process — and they should — their
informational advantages may also be associated with myopia.
Their motivations are strongly influenced by special techno-
logical circumstances and the particular legal and institu-
tional setting and by public as well as private demands.
More generally, it is important to recognize that tech-
nological change involves non-market as well as market
elements. In all of the industry studies presented in the
accompanying volume, there was a "public interest ," expressed
through public policies, in certain aspects of the performance
of the industries. There were elements of cooperation as ; well
as competition in research and development. i; !'••'••
In aviation, computers, and in semi-conductors, there
was, for obvious reasons, a public interest in .how the .tech-
nologies and the industries evolved that transcended tlioi
 : ;
interest of particular private purchasers or producers |:Of :
the products. In these cases, the public interest was mani-
fested in a governmental demand for goods and services of ;a
quite specialized variety and in policies associated with
procurement. ;
In the other four industries studied, there was no such
important procurement interest. However, a public interest
in certain aspects of industry performance shows up in other
policies. In the case of pharmace.Uticals, automobiles, h
ing, and agriculture (as well as aircraft) a public interest
in safety, environmental protection, and in ensuring certaij
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general standards was made manifest in regulations. Several
of these industries also arc marked by various forms of
subsidy to producers or consumers. Citizens and scholars
may divide on the merits and demerits of these regulations
and subsidies. But this makes it no less a fact that public
policies to constrain or supplement market mechanisms pervade
the American economy. And the workings of these policies sig-
nificantly influence the environment for industrial innovation.
Further, the R40 systems of most industries involve
both competitive and cooperative elements, the latter often
university-based. In all of the industries surveyed, for-
prpfit firms creating and taking a proprietary interest in
certain technologies are a large part of the stcry. But in
al-1 pf the industries one can also observe a system of R&D
cooperation and the exchange of technological information,
in some cases, government policy has played a large role in
building and supporting this cooperative system; in other
caes, a smaller role.
With these common elements laid out, we. can now explore
the differences in policicv , in industry characteristics, and
in the apparent viability and effectiveness of policies,
revealed by our case studies. (In what follows, we also draw,
where appropriate, on other studies.) As stated at the outset,
one cannot directly lay out a matrix. But there are several
alternative paths to follow. We could try to assess what in-
dustries are success stories in some sense and discuss the
policies and structures associated with these -- and then go
on to discuss the failures. We could also divide the indus-
tries according to some kind of structural characteristics.
It has proved more straightforward to try to classify policies
(instruments) and proceed to consider where they were and were
not employed and why, and how effective they have been in var-
ious contexts.
3. A Road Mag.
One rough division among instruments places those that
involve direct government funding of R&D in one category
and those that indirectly influence R&D or other activities
involved in industrial innovation in another. While this
division is plausible on its face, notice that the lines
between the categories are blurred, not sharp. How does one
treat, for example, procurement contracts that cover the
cost of R&D incurred earlier by a company who anticipated
the subsequent contract? How does one treat special tax
credits for R&D? These problems notwithstanding, we shall
hazard such a break.
The objective here will be to categorize meaningfully
the various kinds of government R&D support programs revealed
in our case studies — to analyze the reasons tor the signi-
ficant differences in such policies across industries and to
make judgments as to which kinds of programs worked and which
didn.'t. 'We should distinguish among four kinds of government
R&D support programs: (1) those associated with public pro-
curement or other well-defined.public objectives; (2) those
that involve.an extension of support of scientific basic
research to support of research to advance generic technolo-
gical knowledge; (3) programs that are aimed at meeting
reasonably well-defined clientele demands; and (4) the
policy of.picking or supporting "winners" in commercial
competition. . .
In Section C below, we will consider a wide range of
government policies that do not involve direct R&D support --
procurement regulation both old sty.le and new, anti-trust',
policy regarding patents -- to name only the central ones.
But simply listing these, as instruments covers up some funda-
mental problems. Regulation,.for example, has meant fundamen-
tally, different things in different industries; the thrust of
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antitrust policies also have been different; etc. Relatedly
and equally importantly, the central purpose of these policies
often has little to do with spurring or guiding industrial
innovation. There are serious questions as to whether they
should be regarded as promising instruments for that purpose.
B. Government Support of Research and Development.
The case studies reveal sj -nificant differences among
the industries in the extent and kind of federal R&D support.
The government has been an important source of both applied
and basic research funding in the evolution of aviation,
computer, and semi-conductor technologies. The government
has also productively supported both applied and basic res-
earch in agriculture. While the government has been ^n
important supporter of basic research relevant to pharmaceu-, ; ;
ticals, public funding of applied research and development ill; ;
has been mostly constrained to "orphan drugs." The government
never has been able to mount a sustained R&D program relevant :
to the housing and automobile industries. ? : . - . :
It is not easy to measure the efficacy of the various -III:-I
government R&D support programs. In the three defense-related
industries, they certainly have bought us technological pri-; : .
macy. Critics have argued both that much of the bought- s ;
technology has not been necessary for national security but;,
rather has inflamed the arms race, and that many of the R&D
programs have been inordinately expensive and wasteful. It
should be noted that .contributions to the advance of civilian
technology made by defense and space programs, while not the focus
of our case studies, has been a "spill over" and certainly not
the.principal.intent of these programs. The advance of civi-
lian technology was the central purpose of the government R&D
support programs in agriculture, anu of basic bio-medical
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research. The rate of return on the public investment in
RSD for agriculture undoubtedly has been very high. Quanti-
tative estimates are more difficult with respect to the
returns from support of bio-medical research; however, this
too is generally regarded as a very successful research
program. The case studies also reveal two expensive fiascos —
the supersonic transport project and "Operation Breakthrough"
in the housing industry.
How can one make intellectual order out cf this varied
experience? It is important to distinguish among the follow-
ing categories of government R&D support programs. First,
R&D support aimed to achieve a v/ell-defined government pur-
jpose — such as the procurement of a new weapon system or
the solution to the automobile emissions problem. Second,
; support of basic or generic research relevant to a particular
:technology or technologies and not pointed toward achieving
iany particular product or process — such as research on the
•nutritional needs of wheat or the properties of certain exotic
materials. Third, support of applied research and development
on products and processes that serve civilian, not governmental,
purposes and whose acceptance depends in large part on market
calculations made by .-.on-governmental L -tors. This last cate-
gory ought to be further divided, perhaps, into programs in
which the potential users have a considerable influence on
allocation and program in which a government agency has rela-
tively free-handed control over the setting of goals and
priorities. Programs obviously differ in the range of indus-
tries for which they are politically feasible and in the kinds
of circumstances in which they are likely to be effective.
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1. R&p Support Associated with Procurers t Needs or
Other We 11-uefined Purpose^. ~: •-,
in three of our case studies — aviation, computers,
and semi-conductors - there was a strong and recognized
governmental demand for the products produced by the industry,
which led to a particular and focused public interest in
certain kinds of technological advances. A recognized public
sector demand for certain types of technological improvement
lends two important features to the policy conte.xt. First,
it means that the government (or the relevant government
agent) is in a position to define technological targets
according to its own criteria and that it has (or at least
has the motivation to have) some expertise about the techno-
logies in question, second, the recognised governmental
need lends legitimacy to government attempts to stimulate
and guide the evolution of the relevant technologies.
One should note that public procurement:does not inevi-
tably lead to active public-sector effort to mold or stimulate
technological advance. The federal government procures type-
writers, office calculators, automobiles, and a wide variety
of products that are identical (or virtually so) with those
purchased by non-governmental users. In these cases, the
federal government usually has chosen simply to act as an
informed shopper. Even in cases in which government demands
are somewhat special, the government has not always stepped
in with a special procurement contract for the creation of
a product-tailored
 :to its use or even strongly advertised its
special interest through an implicit promise of procurement.
In the three industries in question, however, the relevant
government agencies deliberately tried to.induce the develop-
ment of products that.were .suited for their purposes. The
vehicles employed included procurement contracts written so
as to cover the IUD cost's of the particular design (.a dis-
guised form of R&D support), direct R&D support associated ,
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with a procurement contract, and support of basic and
generic research.
If pub lie-sec to_- needs and private-sector needs differ
sharply, the procurement and applied research and develop-
;'- ment funding aspects of such policies would not facilitate
the evolution of technology for the private sector. At
| least three cases suggest, however, that government efforts
to advance technology for public sector purposes can also
i enhance technological capabilities to meet private needs.
, In the early days of these technologies, R&D aimed at a
j governmental purpose almost always had some commercial spill-
I over. As these technologies matured, the governmental
i (military) market and the civilian market began to separate,
| ; i with the civilian market becoming increasingly important to
certain companies. Governments-financed applied research and
i J development associated with public procurement became in- ;;
 :
';,•:.: creasingly distinct in form from R&D financed by th<? companies
;:i themselves and aimed at products in the civilian market. I \:-
• ! ; • ' ' A t the present time, the principal impact of the govern-
: . ment on the evolution of a civilian technology in these I ;;: :
j: industries would appear to come via public support of basic; :
• •'.
 :
: and generic research. This fall-off in "spill-over" has p.;ed;
to proposals that the government consciously fund projects:.:,
that have likely civilian benefits. Thu supersonic transport
ought to warn against this stra*- "jy; and we shall present some
general arguments against it later in this section. i :
The lesson to draw from these cases is not basically
one about the efficacy of "spill-over." The lesson is that
the government has the capability intelligently to f.und ap-
plied research and development as well as basic and generic
research when there is a well-defined public interest in
' particular kinds of technological advances. -.
-49-
Orphan drugs are another case in point. Here, 33 with
the examples of defense procurement, a government agency
stands ready to see that the fruits of R&D are employed.
There is a recognized public commitment to try to cure or
relieve the suffering of people with grave diseases. If
necessary, public monies will go into the procurement of
whatever it takes to do this. Thus, orphan drugs are not,
as it were, in the position of having to make it in a
conventional commercial market. As with the case of the
decision by the Department of Defense to procure a new
fighter (or as with the space program) one can argue about
how much tax money ought to go into the pursuit of the ob-
jective, and about whether the program is being conducted
efficiently. But there is little question about the political
legitimacy of the program, or about the potential ability of
government decision-makers to marshal the information needed
to ;make sensible R&D decisions.
The. case of pollution abatement is similar in context,
:if not in policy. Since the middle 1950s, there has been a
well-recognized public interest attached to the development
of technologies that are less polluting than those currently
being employed. Some public monies have gone into R&D on
pollution abatement. But the Clean Air Act of 1970 marked
a commitment to a strategy for achieving the objective that
minimized the government's direct role in funding R&D.
Rather, the strategy was to induce private funding of R&D
.through the imposition of regulatory requirements that could
be .net only by the development of new technologies. White
and other scholars have argued that this has proved an inef-
ficient and costly way of drawing forth the new technologies.
Given a recognized public commitment to their achievement,
the government certainly was in a position to fund R&D on
its own and to organize to gain the information needed to.
make sensible R&D allocation decisions.
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The examples that come from our case studies suggest
two things. First, there is a wide range of technologies
associated with public procurement (or public subsidy of
certain kinds of private purchases or regulation) for which
particular technological advances are recognized public ob-
jectives. Second, the government has adopted a wide variety
of strategies on the extent and kind of R&D it will support
in thesa areas. At one extreme, the government has financed
the bulk of the relevant R&D;' and at the other it, has stood
passively as a consumer. While assessment of this assertion
depends on a case-by-case evaluation, one could argue that,
in many cases, the government has been too passive, that the
returns to public funding of R&D on public needs would be
very high, and that indirect means to "pull" technology (as
through regulation) often are more costly and less efficient
than direct R&D support. Note that the argument here is not
that the government support of such R&D would have significant
"spill-over" benefits. It is simply that there are a large
number of technologies for which there is an. identifiable
public interest, in certain kinds of advances, and in many of
these cases federal R&D funds could be spent to yield a high
social rate of return. .
The efficacy of such programs depends, however, on the
ability of the relevant government agencies to gether the
appropriate information and make sensible R&D allocation,
decisions. Access to such information .implies strong parti-
cipation by users. R&D. support programs have to be designed
to achieve this participation. The development of better .
technologies for the provision of public .services — e..g.,
for mass transport, garbage col lecf.ion, repairing city
streets, etc.. -- can potentially yield a very high rate of
return on the public R&D dollar. However, when -- unlike,
the Department of Defense — the Department of Transportation
or the Department of Hous.ing and' Urban Development • make R&D
allocation decisions, they are .not usually making them regard-
. ing items that they themselves will procure. The principal.
• • ' •• - -51- • -• ' :.- "....-. '
^^users will be state and local governments. Similarly,
public financing of the R&O required by the environmental
and safety goals may yield high social returns and avoid
the high private costs and tangled relations that come
from the current regulatory strategies. However, the new
: technologies will ultimately be employed by pri ite firms,
not federal agencies. The institutional machinery needed
I to spend such public R&D monies efficiently will have to be
different from that of the Department of Defense or NASA.
i Perhaps the pluralistic decentralized structure of the
i . government's agricultural R&D support programs would provide
| a better model.
i
i •
i ; 2, Support of Basic and Generic .Research.
| i .": Absent a recognized public interest in _nc -olution of
 :
| : a particular technology, certain constraints apt. .- on the . :;:•
i M;: government's ability to fund R&D. In the first i .ace, a '|;j-
I ; :' :'. government agency has no particular claim to be able to deteri-
i •'. • • mine R»D priorities, and may be blocked from access to the If
''.'•\ information necessary to do so. Second, the legitimacy of ;;
:
 publicly financed R&D programs, which may upset the status ;. ;
1
 :- : •
; quo within an industry, may be questioned and such programs 1:1
blocked politically. These constraints are particularly l'\^.
binding with respect to applied R&D aiming to achieve parti-, :
cular new products and processes. They appear to be much ;
less confining for public support of basic and generic M.
research a step or two away from specific application.
Our case studies show the government actively involved
in support of such research not only in the three industries
in which there was a strong procurement interest -- aviation,
computers, and semi-conductors -- but also in agriculture and
the scientific fields relating to pharmaceutical development's.-
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The aborted Cooperative Automotive Research Program repre-
sented an attempt to extend this t^pe of public program to
the automobile industry.
To understand the nature and importance of these
public programs, it is important to recognize that tech-
nological knowledge inevitably involves a public as well
as a proprietary component. The public part of technological
knowledge generally does not relate to the design or opera-
.tional details of a particular product or process but to
broad design concepts, general working characteristics of
.processes, properties of materials that are used, testing
:techniques, etc. Most of such knowledge is not poitentable.
Much of it is openly shared among scientists and engineers
working in the field, whether they are located at universities,
government laboratories, or corporate laboratories.
; The kind of research that leads to such knowledge is
hot generally the sort that an academic scholar,, pursuing
fashionable questions in a standard scientific field, would
explore. Rather, the research questions are posed by
technological problems and opportunities- and the objective
is to enhance that understanding and the capability to solve
.practical problems. In some industries, progressive private
companies themselves support some of this type of research.
While some secrecy is involved, it is recogn^zed that the
findings from this type of research ought to flow into the
public domain. Such a research system fits in between more
fundamental .research_. defined by \-raditional sciences, and
the applied research and development of che firms in the
industry. To be effective, the system has to make good con-
tact with both sides but avoid too much overlap and duplication.
In the judgment of Evenson and other scholars the ag-
ricultural sciences have in general managed to define their
niche appropriately. The research they do lies in betwevi*.
th-j basic academic sciences like chemistry and biology on
one side, and the research that goes on in public experi-
mentation stations and private companies on the other side,
to develop better see^.; or fertilizers, etc. Both sides
influence the kind of research that is done and monitor
quality and efficacy. The bio-med.vcal research community
is a similar syscem. It too is pulled from one side by the
interests of practitioners (physicians) and private companies
in having practical problems illuminated, arid is disciplined
from the other side by scientists in the more basic sciences.
It is interesting that both the agricultural sciences and
the bio-medical sciences tend to find their home in universi-
ties -- but in professional schools rather than in colleges
of arts and sciences.
. The government provides the bulk of support for these ;l • .
two research communities. The allocation of research re- !;.';.
sources, however, is guided, only loosely by government agencies. .
The Department of Agriculture, the state legislatures, and?: :
the National Institutes of Health — the principal support; ; ;
agencies — leave the details of allocation-to machinery I:;;M
operated by th<% research communities themselves. However,;;;:;!
in political deliberations about the level of funding and ?; :: ;•
broad research strategies, the focus is very much on the -. I
practical benefits that have flowed from the programs and.':. ' •-
the practical problems that future research promises to !|;,: '.'
resolve.
i
Mowery and Rosenberg remark tlv.t the old NACA did not
sponsor much in the way of basic research. In the pulling
and tugging to be applied und relevant on the on<r hand, and
to be rigorous and scientific on the other, the first kind
of pull clearly was significantly stronger than the second
during the '20s and "30s. This well may reflect the fact
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that NACA, unlike the agricultural experimentation stations
and the medical schools, was a free-standing organizational
entity not affiliated with a university or universities.
Nonetheless, NACA undertook many experiments and studies
that were relevant to aviation technology in general, rather
than concentrating on particular aircraft designs that were
being contemplated or were on the drawing board. In thrt
sense, NACA certainly did support generic research and, as
History testifies, to strong positive effect. The rolt; of
;NACA diminished after World War II. In the post-war era,
:the armed services increasingly funded their principal
contractors to do the kind of research that NACA used to do.
No sharply separate generic research programs mark the
computer and semi-conductor industries. While sometimes
special government agencies were involved (for example,
the Advanced.Research Projects Agency of DOD), government
funds for generic research for these technologies -- as in
aviation after World War II — have flowed to companies and
to the universities. But this reser.rch support has been
very important. Funds continue to be significant.
The aborted experience in CARP suggest that government
programs in support of basic and generic research can be
acceptable in virtually any industry, though the specific
conditions must be discussed with all concerned. Companies
do: not perceive such programs as posir-g jharp threats to
their comiuevcial positions, or '_Me tnr s t" perceived are
seen as diffuse and not readi.ly ident. >'e cs dangerous
to any particular portion of the industry. Such proprietary
knowledge is not needed to guia. *• . cc«tion; mechanisms can
be established to allocate resources sensibly. However, this
must be done without disruption to planned private research
if it is to be supportive.
-55-
The key question is the efficacy of such programs.
In the industry studies we have conducted, the verdict is
positive. Where private companies support little generic
research, the case for public support seems specially
strong. Where private companies support such research,
the case for public funding is diminished, but certainly
not eliminated. Thus in the computer industry and in
semi-conductors, where the companies themselves do engage
in significant funding of generic research, there is
advocacy of, not opposition to, government funding of research
at universities. (There is, of course, a risk that public
funds in such cases largely replace private funds rather
than adding to them.)
Perhaps, then, programs like the Cooperative Automotive
Research Program (CARP) and the Cooperative Generic Techno-
logy Program (COGENT) proposed during the Carter administra-
tion, are not entirely misguided in concept. "Generic1'
research programs might well be.an appropriate topic.of
discussion during the next resurgence of concern within
policy circles for boosting industrial innovation.
3. Support of'Clientele-Oriented Applied Research.
Public support of basic and generic research does not
require program officers to form judgments about which par-
ticular technological developments would be most valuable.
Rather, the objective is to enhance understanding of rela-
tively basic principles or to .explore certain potentially
widely applicable technological routes. Furthermore, this .
kind of research seldom, poses an immediate perceived threat
3. Cf. Chapter IV below. ; .
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to the proprietary interests of particular groups or firms.
In contrast, government programs of support of applied
research and development for an industry whose products are
evaluated largely on commercial markets requires a mechanism
for making commercial judgments and may provide some signi-
ficant perceived threats to particular firms.
The case of public support of applied research and
development for agriculture indicates that, even with these
constraints, a feasible government program may be effective.
It is interesting to consider which aspects of the inrlustry,
and the program, have permitted an effective program.
In the first place, farming is an atomistic industry,
and farmers are not in rivalrous competition with each
other. Differential access to certain kinds of technological
knowledge, or property rights in certain technologies, are 5:
not important to individual farmers. This fact at once means;
that farmers have little incentive to engage in R&D on their;
own behalf and opens the possibility that the farming comnm-;;;:
nity itself would provide a political constituency for publip:
support of R&D. . lll; :
The federal/state agricultural experimentation system, |ij:!
established under the Hatch and subsequent acts, marshalled J ;:;
that support and put the farmers in a position of evaluating
and influencing the publicly funded applied R&D. The systerri
is highly decentralized. The regional nature of agricultural
technology means that farmers in individual states see it to
theiL advantage that their particular technologies be advanced
as rapidly as possible. Where private companies are funding .
significant amounts.of innovative work and the industry is
reasonably competitive, it is in the interest of the farmers,
as well as the companies, that public R&D money be allocated
to other things. As Evenson describes it, a reasonably well-
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defined division of labor has emerged between publicly
funded and privately funded applied research.
Even son and ether historians of technical change in
agriculture have argued that the applied research and
development efforts of the experimentation stations did not
yield particularly high rates of return until a body of more
scientific and technological understanding was developed.
It was this combination of an evolving set of agricultural
sciences based in the universities and supported publicly,
and applied research and development also publicly funded
but monitored politically by the farming community, that has
made public support of agricultural technology as successful
as iit has been.
; ; :•• Can the experience in agriculture be duplicated else-
where? It is apparent that man;; people have seen housing
and agriculture as quite similar. Henry Wallace, who earlier
served as Roosevelt's Secretary of Agriculture, clearly drew
the analogy when, after the war, he tried (and failed) as
Secretary of Commerce to initiate a major program of federal
funding of building research. The efforts to revive that
idea under the Kennedy administration also were explicitly
based on the agricultural analogy. The analogy was also
drawn in "Operation Breakthrough." It is obvious that there
are i important differences.
• ; In the first place, while the building industry is
atomistic, construction markets are local and therefore
builders are, to some extent, in rivalrous competition with
one another. However, since individual builders possess
little in the way of proprietary knowledge, this was not a
particularly important obstacle. What was more important
was that suppliers of inputs and equipment to builders pro-
duce different, and rivalrous, products. Direct qovcrnment
support, of applied research and development was viewed by '''^
many of them as potentially threateniny. Had the builders
of houses formed a strong constituency for government .
support of R&D, these resistances of input suppliers might
have been overcome. However, no such constituency developed.
Unlike the case in agriculture where farmers saw it to
their competitive advantage (as a group) to have their
technologies advanced relative to the technologies employed
by farmers in other regions, builders apparently saw no such
advantages for them. .
Nor did there exist in housing, as there came to exist
in agriculture, a scientific community that could point per-
suasively to promising areas for applied research and develop-
ment. Residential construction lacks a broad scientific bas;?
from which to mount applied research and development endeavor.
Thus agriculture had both a constituency .interested in
getting applied research and .development relevant to their
needs 'undertaken and, ultimately at least, a sound .scientific
basis beneath its technologies. Residential construction has
neither. One may conjecture that programs in support of
residential construction technology will not be politically
feasible until the clientele Js established to support and
guard them, and will not be effective.in the absence of some
sort of underlying scientific base.
It probably is the case, therefore, that the agricultural
model of pub.lic support of applied R&D is not readily extond-
ible to many, other industries. There may be a few, however,
to which such a program is applicable. Again, the key ingred-
ients would appear to be (1) a group of users of a technology
who are not in rivalrous competition with each other.but who,.
together, have a significant interest in getting their techno-,
logics advanced and (2) a scientific base strong enough that
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applied research and development can be fruitful. One
might also note that these ctre the conditions under which
one. might think of establishing industry "cooperative"
research and development laboratories. Indeed, the agricul-
tural experimentation.stations might be regarded as just
that — except for one important difference. Much of the
policy discussions about cooperative research and develop-
ment has presumed that public funds should account for only
a small portion of total R&D monies, and that the industry
should contribute the bulk of the funds save for, perhaps,
the first few years of the program. Under such terms, it
has proved hard to get much cooperative R&D underway and
sustained. The agricultural case suggests that the require-
ment for industry financing may be a mistake. In industries -
like agriculture — where such programs are plausible, prices
tend to follow costs. The returns to successful R&D go
largely to consumers, not to producers. The difficulty with ':;
extending the agricultural model is not that the public at
large would not benefit, but that the conditions under which ;
this model is applicable would appear to be rather special, j:
4. Government-Guided Applied R&D with Commercial Ends. I I;
In Operation Breakthrough and the Supersonic Transport ;=;
Project, the government got itself into the business of ::
trying to identify or develop products that would sell well :i .
on complex commercial markets. In Operation Breakthrough, --\•;'
the Department of Housing and Urban Development was neither :
itself a major builder of houses nor a buyer of non-subsidised
housing. It thus did not have any particular expertise for
judging what types of designs .would be most promising, let
alone which, would.likely sell or rent. Thus it was easy for
the Department -- and Congress -- to lose track of the objec-
tives as the program was debated politically. Similarly, the
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FAA was not in the business of building, or procuring,
commercial airlines. The commercial airlines were singu-
larly discouraging when asked about their interest in a
supersonic transport. The aircraft producers showed no
particular interest in designing and building such a vehicle
until the subsidies grew very large.
Very few of the housing designs created through Opera-
tion Breakthrough proved viable commercially, nor did they
serve as a significant basis f;or follow-up design work. The
British/French experience with their supersonic transport
indicates how fortunate the United States was that the prog-
ram was stopped before it resulted in a technologically
(though not commercially) viable aircraft.
; The lesson here is not particular to these two cases;
it is a general onef There are many other studied cases,
most of these European, in which the government has tried
to identify and support particular products they hoped
.would ultimately prove to be commercial successes. While
ithere were a few successes, the batting average has been
very low except where the government in question has been
.willing to subsidize, or require the procurement of, the com-
4
pleted product as well as the R&D on it.
This should not be surprising. In many of the indus-
tries in which this has been attempted (in Europe), the
private companies also were investing in R&D, and the
government was in a position either of duplicating private
effort; subsidizing that effort and probably therefore
4. See, generally, K. Pavitt and W. Walker., "Government
policies Toward Industrial Innovation: A Review,"
Research Policy, Vol. 5, No. 1, January, 1976.
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replacing private RiD monies; or investing in a design
that the privatt; companies had decided to leave alone. In
the last case, it might be argued, there is a legitimate
public role in supporting work on designs that are a gener-
ation ahead of those that the companies themselves are
exploring. However, as the supersonic transport and a
number of other like examples indicates, the sensible way
to explore the next generation of technologies is through
doing generic research, building and studying prototypes,
etc. The appropriate research program is one modeled after
NACA, not one modeled after the supersonic transport project.
If the United States were to drop its anti-trust laws,
and the objective of preserving intra-U.S. competition that
those laws are supposed to embody, then it might be possible
to mount a policy to help industry search for "winners."
In various of the European countries —• and Japan — compe-
tition is viewed not so much in terms of rivalry among
domestic companies but in terms of competition from abroad.
In these circumstances, it is possible for a government to
work with [industry as a whole, and to participate in laying
the bets, and in dividing of the market. As the law exists
in the United States, much • >f the information needed to
guide a government program to help industry find and support
"winners" is proprietary, not shared among firmsi and not
accessible to a governmental body. The experience of the
European governments in trying to pick winners indicates
the costs of these American constraints are not severe; con-
straints are looser in Europe and the record of public policies
to help industry identify and support winners is not .encour-
aging. The experience in Japan, may or may not be different.
As the present time not enough is known about what the Japanese
actually do to make a judgment on this. In any case, modes
of government-industry cooperation in Japan are so radically
different from those in the United States that it is doubtful
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we can learn much of use to us from the Japanese
experience.
It is a shame that so much of the discussion about
government support of industrial R&D in the United States
has swirled around the question: should the government try
to pick winners? The evidence from our case studies answers
that question with a resounding no. However, the experience
a1so shows that there are many other potentially fruitful
ways that the government can support industrial research and
development.
C. Policy Affecting the Climate for Private R&D.
Much of the preceding section was spent disentangling
various kinds of government R&D support, attempting to
identify the reasons why such support has taken different
form in. different industries, and hazarding guesses as to •••:.;
the effects. The same kinds of analytical challenges face ji
us in. this section, which is concerned with a variety of ;; =.
government policies that hava influenced the climate for |;:
private R&D and innovation but which do not involve direct Lp
governmental support of RiD. Regulation, for example, has ;;
meant very different things in the various industries |-,
studied. ' s-\f
The fact that the policies considered here do not
involve, direct R&D support may not be the most important J
difference between these policies and those considered in i:
the preceding section. The policies discussed above were,
obv.ously intended to influence technological advance.
However, many of the policies considered here were put in
place for quite other purposes. It is not clear whether, or
to what extent, they realistically can be regarded as instru-
ments that .might be consciously employed to influence
innovation.
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Put another way, the problem is this. Virtually
every policy of government influences the clima;.-3 for
innovation in some way, in greater or lesser degree.
For only a few is the influence on innovation a major
factor considered in design and implementation of the
policies. Which policies should be considered explicitly
here? Presumably those whose influence is significant and
whose design might be improved through evidence about the
policy's impact on innovation. Unfortunately, evidence of
magnitude of impact is hard to come by. Therefore, the
focus must, and should, be on policies widely regarded —
whether correctly or not -- as having a significant effect
and as subject to modification to make that effect more
positive or less negative. Since the case studies contain
relatively rich material on them, we shall focus on four
;such classes of policy: procurement; regulation; anti-
!trust; and patent and other policies affecting property
!rights on inventions. And we conclude this section by
idiscussing why it may not be particularly fruitful to view
imost of these instruments as capable of playing a pc«ei.r-j.l
role in policy packages designed for the express purpose
of stimulating industrial innovation.
1• Procurement.
In undertaking its many and varied activities, the
federal government buys a wide range of products. If one
also considers the state and local government activities
that the federal government helps to finance — riot to men-
tion the regulatory and other objectives of government —
it becomes clear that the government is a direct or indirect
purchaser of virtually everything. But the range of products
for which the government has actively and consciously at-
tempted to spur technological advances to enable it to
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achieve its objectives more effectively or in a less costly
manner is actually quite limited. .We argued above that
there might be a high payoff to extending the range of such
products considerably. Such an extension would enhance the
capability of government to meet accepted public sector needs,
while at the same time contributing to the advance of techno-
: logics for products sold and bought on commercial markets.
' As the case studies show, there are a number of ways
in which the government can attempt to draw forth technplo-
i gical advances. At one extreme, it. can itself undertake or
i contract for virtually all of the R&D in the area. At the
| . other extreme, it can advertise its interest in products
i . with certain characteristics, and entice and support private
1 R&D efforts through.its procurement policies, with only
limited direct public funding of R&D.
i
! . • .
J Much has bsen said about the role of government in
I . ."making a market" for certain kinds of technological ad-
l vances -- usually with the implicit assumption that this
I is a kind of policy very different from that of government
' . R&D support for the work leading to those advances. In
:
 . fact, the distinction :is actually quite a fuzzy one. When-
' ever the government tries to "make a market" for a new
i . . . . . .
technology, it. inevitably and appropriately will be drawn
into some R&D support. Conversely, government R&D support
of public-sector technologies does not make sense in the
absence of aggressive procurement policies which, in turn,
. will almost inevitably induce certain privately financed
efforts. In short, "making a market" for technological
advances and R&D funding to facilitate those•advances are
closely tied together, with the mix of R&D inducement and
R£D support a.matter.of tactics not strategy. Aggressive
procurement is one aspect of a policy designed to draw forth
better .technologies that have both public-sector and non-
governmental applications. Such procurement policies are
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^a complement— not a substitute — for government R&D
support policies in such areas.
' 2. Regulation.
»,
K
'• If the reader approaches this study with any strong,
( simple ideas of the effect of regulation on technologicalchange in industry, a reading of the case studies may quickly
disabuse him of these. The studies reveal how diverse regu-
I lation is and how complex and subtle its influences sometimes
} are.
• . The automobile industry and, to a lesser extent,
residential construction reveal what has been called "new
\ style" regulation at work. (As the housing example testifies,
;J new style regulation is not so new.) Regulation here amounted
:.; to the imposition of certain requirements on the products j ;
; produced or the technology employed with the objective of •-;'.
I assuring certain standards of quality, or safety, .or protect-s ;
; •; ing the environment, etc. However, regulation, has had quite ;j ;;•
; different purposes in the two cases, and has had different il ;:
; consequences for technological advance. . • ji ;;;
' ' ' " \'. '• '
:'. In the housing case, regulation has been conservative. ;!;;.:
Building codes and standards have stuck pretty close to !;;;':
prevailing techniques and materials, or simple modifications; ::
thereof. Far from being aimed at drawing forth new mater- ;•
ials and methods, housing regulation has tried to monitor |j-/
and screen these and, in fact, has made significant inno- .:
vation expensive if not downright impossible. In contrast,
regulation in the automobiles case has been used aggressively
to pull forth now technologies. When the regulations were
. imposed, it was well understood that prevailing technologies
could not meet the standards. One can argue about whether
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regulation was the most appropriate or efficient method to
pull forth the desired innovations. White and other scholars
believe that the route has been inefficient and expensive.
Although this regulation strategy may have led the government
to neglect direct R&D funding, it is certainly not the case
that regulation has deterred innovation.
Pharmaceutical regulation is something else again.
Originally concerned with maintaining purity standards and
safety, in the 1960s regulation began to try to assure effi-
cacy as well and to constrain and monitor the safety of the
R&D process itself. There are very real questions about
whether the post-1960.s regulatory environment has actually
increased the' efficacy of the new drugs that reach .the
market or guarded the safety of .patients and experimental
;--ubjects to any significantly enhanced degree. As Grabowski
and'Verncii argua, it is not easy to pin down and separate
the effect of U.S. pharmaceutical regulation on the flow of
new'pharnaceuticals into the cornucopia. It is clear, how-
ever, that regulatii i has significantly increased R&D costs,
and delayed the introduction of new drugs compared to the
date of introduction in countries with different regulatory
regimes.
The effects of new-style regulation show up less
strikingly in the other industry studies. However, environ-
mental and safety regulation has in recent years come to
play a significant role in influencing.the fertilizers and
pesticides that farmers are allowed to use and, relatedly,
the tests and hurdles a new agricultural substance must over-
come before it can be introduced to the market. No study of
the effect of such regulations on the flow of fertilizers
and pesticides comparable to the studies of the effects of
regulations on the introduction of new Pharmaceuticals has
ever been made.
In our case studies, civil aviation appears as the
industry most strongly influenced by what has been called
"old style" public uti lity regulation -- regulation aimed
at constraining prices and requiring certain standards of
service delivery. In this particular case, the airlines,
while regulated, were in rivalrous competition with each
other. Further, the industry doing most of the relevant
R&D — the airframe industry — was not regulated. The
consequences of regulation undoubtedly was to spur innovation.
As hc;s been the case in other regulated but rivc.ii.ous
industries -- for example, railroads — regulation in the
aircraft industry must be understood as setting floors under
prices as well as establishing ceilings. In the airline
case, the result wa;> that, since rate competition was blocked
on lucrative competitive runs, the airlines' competitiveness
spilled over into the providing o2 better services and seats
on more attractive aircraft. The consequence was that the •;;;:{:•
airlines provided a strong, indeed eager, market for n^'v s | •• •:
aircraft. It has been often argued that old-style public 1M:
utility regulation stifles innovation; this most emphati- ? : • ; . :
call}- was not the case here. This is not to argue that the;:H
regulation of air transport was a desirvbit; policy from a f v ' ;
social point of view or ever that the stimulus provided LyN'iK.!
regulation for the development of transport aircraft was "•'•'•'.'
socially de:3irable. It. s .imply is to warn against th=3 sii;;:.l; ;••- ;
minded .notion that regulation cf^nerally deters all kinas oi^.',;
innovation . : : . '
Tr .• ew of the diversity of regulation and its impact,
'c' ition or regulatory reform means different thinys in
different industries. For the airlines, it has meant the
abandonment of rate regulation and the relaxation of CAB
control on routes. While the new regime of aircraft compe-r
tit ion may provide strong demand for new aircraft, it is
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hard to argue that the demand will be any stronger than
it was under the old regulated regime, although the pattern
of demand may be different. Airline deregulation is part
and parcel of the deregulation movement for industries
which, in the past, have been treated as public utilities
despite t-.he fact that their structure permitted consider-
able competition.
Reform of environmental and safety regulation involves
,a different set of issues and strategies. There is a move-
'ment "nowadays to create regulation-setting machinery that
will consider costs as well as benefits; toward using per-
formance standards rather than prescribing particular
technologies; and (in some cases) toward the use of fees or
marketable licenses rather than quantitative restrictions.
;_V-'.v..h a reformed regulatory regime would quite likely provide
;a -. ettv.i., if not necessarily a stronger, environment for the
general..; --, jf technological advances that respect environ-
mental and safe1 " ;'alues. However, what is needed here is
more sophisticated regulation, not "deregulation." Unfor-
tunately, much'of the apparent thrust toward modification of
"new style" regulation is toward abandonment rather than
reform.
For the pharmaceutical industry, regulatory reform
largely means simplifying and speeding up the evaluation
precedures for new drugs. Grabowski and Vernon argue the
current, regulatory regime has significantly retarded and
increased the cost of pharmaceutical innovation in the
United States, and that the most effective available vehicle
for spurring innovation is regulatory reform. However, of
the industries studied in this report, pharmaceuticals
probably is unique in this respect.
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3. Anti-trust.
Just. .* with regulation, nany people carry around in
their heads an over.-simplif ied and distorted view of what
anti-trust has meant for technological advance. The case
studies reveal quite complicated and varied stories.
The pharma. ..aticai and automobile industries have been
traditional targets of anti-trust prosecution. Usually,
however, the anti-trust cases have not involved innovation,
or R&D, directly, but rather have been concerned with such
old-fashioned matters as price fixing or other "conspiracies
in the restraint of trade." In the pharmaceutical industry,
a'few of these have involved* patent licensing and other rela-
ted issues. However, neither the Grabowski and Vernon study,
nor other studies of the pharmaceutical industry, have-
argued that anti-trust has had much of an infliiei^o on
innovation in the industry, one way or anothe< .
In the automobile industry, it is. quite possible, that
concern about anti-trust action has deterred General' Motors
from being as aggressive technologically as it might have
been. On.a few occasions anti-trust has touched directly
on issues relating to K.sO and technological advance. The
restrictions on patent pooling and on certain forms ot" co-
operative R&D were noted in White's .case study. The lawyers
for the automobile company certainly had misgivings about
what the anti-trust division would do if they joined tho
proposed Cooperative Automotive Research Program. However,
present anti-trust guidelines, which permit .coopox-at ive Rf.D
if the results are not treated as proprietary, would appear
to leave room for programs of this sort and for most fruitful
kinds of government-industry cooperative programs -- provided,
of course, that the industry is persuaded that such guidelines
are a suitable.guarantee of futiire Justice Department behavior.
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The computer industry is an interesting case for think-
ing through certain conundrums about anti-trust and industrial
innovation. The history presented in the case study stops
at just about the time that IBM achieved the dominance which
it now has maintained for close to twenty years. As Katz
and Phillips show, IBM was successful in part because it
guessed right technologically and in part because it judged
the market correctly. Other scholars have remarked that its
previous dominance in the punch-card .calculator business gave
IBM a special advantage in the sale of computers to business
users. Scholars and lawyers may argue whether it was techno-
logical leadership, shrewd judging of the market, effective
marketing, taking advantage of old ties, or behavior subject
to prosecution under the anti-trust laws that have enabled
IBM to preserve its dominance in large scale civilian compu-
ters. Nonetheless, the anti-trust cases have involved, in
an essential way, complaints about the way IBM go^s about;;,
designing and. introducing new computers, and the remedies'; :.;
proposed include some that would significantly limit the ? - \
freedom of action of IBM regarding R&D and innovation. !;!;. •;
The case studies reveal at least two striking instances
whore anti-trust and other structural policies preserved;;or;
created a competitive market structure with apparent saluH;;
tary effects on industrial .innovation. Although some scholars
maintain that AT&T had no interest in going into production
for sale of transistors anyhow, the 1956 consent decree {• I
legally foreclosed that option. The evolution of the semi-
conductor industry might have been different had AT&T decided
to get into the commercial market. One might also note that
the consent decree, while most visible in our semi-conductor
study, stopped AT&T from going into any commercial market not
directly connected witn the telephone service. The evolution
of the commercial computer industry might have been signifi-
cantly different absent the restraints on Bell Labs and WestcJIi
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Electric.. As this report is written, Congress and the
Administration are debating proposals to relax constraints
on AT&T.
A second example of government policies that influenced
an industry's structure in a way that had a profound effect
on technological advance is the revised Airmail Act of 1934.
This fret broke up vertical integration among airlines, air-
line manufacturers, and engine manufacturers, and left a
more open and competitive structure. Again, it is difficult
to judge what would have happened if the industry had re-
mained vertically integrated, but it is hard to imagine that
technological advance would have been any faster than it was.
14:.!. Patent and Related Policies. .
; ? ;" How about public policies that affect. patenting and,
more generally, the ability of the company to appropriate
the returns to an invention it makes? Again, the-picture
is mixed and complex., . . . . . .
In the pharmaceutical industry, it is apparent that
the ability to patent, a new drug is virtually essential
"if.that drug is to be profitable for the company that creates
it. Indeed, the whole history of the pharmaceutical industry
would likely have been different had the courts ruled that
antibiotics, as natural substances, cculd not be patented.
However, in Pharmaceuticals the question of the effective
duration of a proprietary market hinges not only on patent
life but on the decisions of physicians and pharmacists and
on laws impinging on these decisions (e.g., regarding whether
to prescribe and give out a "generic" or brand-name drug
when, the former is available). .Arguments against generic
See, for example, Ernest Holsendolph, "Senate Passes
AT&T Decontrol," The New York Times, October 8, 1981,
p. A-l. .
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prescription are, in effect, arguments that protection
provided by a patent ought to extend beyond its legal limit.
Of course, the effective life of a patent in the pharmaceut-
ical industry depends on the relationship between the date
of patenting and the date of commercial introduction of the
product. The testing:-and licensing requirements mean that
there is .Often a very considerable -.ag. between patent
application and commercialization. Returns to invention in
the pharmaceutical industry clearly depend on a wider set of
variables than the strength of th't patents.
For many of the other industries studied, legal pro-
tection of proprietary rights seems to be less important
than in Pharmaceuticals. Key patents have played a role in
the evolution of mechanical machinery in agriculture, and in
inducing new chemical compounds like fertilizers and pesti-
cides. However, while hybrids were judged patentable, it
is not apparent that a patent adds much to the protection a
seed company has for its particular hybrid. .A potential
competitor cannot really discern the exact nature of that
crossing that led to the particular hybrid seed. In this
case the patent may.be a minor rather than a major element
in assuring appropriability. .
In semi-conductors, while firms, patent .their new
devices, these patents do not have much.force. Sometimes
producers of new devices are able to hide their design from
potential competitors by "potting.." But in this industry
imitation is generally quick. Indeed, the insistence of
government and other purchasers of seiii-conductors on "second
sourcing" requires in effect that a firm's new design be pro-
duced by another firm as well as the innovator. The profits
to a successful innovator in this industry would appear to
reside largely in. the .head start that provides a short period
during which the innovating firm is the sole Supplier and an
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ability to mo^e down the learning curve before other firms
get into production.
With a few interesting exceptions, patents appear not
to have played a particularly important role in inducing,
or making profitable, innovation in automobiles or civil
aircraft. Indeed, in both industries there has been a
tradition of relatively easy patent licensing, or even
patent pooling. The reason for the lack of interest in a
particular patent would appear to be that automobiles and
aircraft are complex systems, and that particular patentable
components do not really play much of a role in determining
the attractiveness of the overall system. It is the general
overall engineering of the product that counts, and that is
not readily patentable. Much the same situation seems to
apply in computers. While patent suits marked the early
history of the industry, IBM's prominent position does not
rest on its patent holdings.
5. General Purpose Instruments, More Generally_.
It would be easy to draw on the case studies and other
material to extend tho list of government policies that in-
fluence the climate for industrial innovation. Some of these
policies are broad in scope, although their influence differs
from industry to industry. While the influence of the tax ;
code is pervasive, particular features, like the treatment::
 :
of capital gains, appear to be particularly important to - 1 ; . .
certain industries. Thus it has been argued that the higher
taxation of capital gains that came with the tax bills of the
early '70s had an especially strong negative effect on funds
to finance innovation in the semi-conductor industry. It is
unlikely that, these statute changes had a comparable effect
on aviation. While monetary policy is cross-cutting, our
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particular monetary institutions segregate.the housing
i.iaustry and make that industry bear the brunt of the
economic fluctuations to a great extent. Some policies
are aimed at particular industries. Special price support
programs certainly have influenced technological advance
in agriculture. The trade agreement with Japan regardi"~
the importation of television sets especially affected the
U.S. semi-conductor industry. One could go on. However,
if our search is for instruments that can be considered
powerful tools for a policy to stimulate, industrial innova-
tion, such extended listing and analysis is not likely to ".. '
j be fruitful. There are several reasons.
:; First, the broad policies in question have been put in
place for a variety of reasons. Arguments about their
;• effect on industrial innovation will carry only limited
•weight in influencing the debate about their reform. This
;is not to say that such arguments have no influence. A
•tax credit for R&D was proposed by several groups as an
• important instrument to spur innovation, and such a tax
;credit was part of the recent Reagan tax .modification package.
:But an R&D tax credit was only a small part of that bill,
and it is unlikely that the particular proposal would have .
been heeded had there not been a general thrust toward tax
reductions of various kinds.
Second, the broad policies in question often differ in
the particulars of their application from sector to sector.
Therefore, it is virtually impossible to identify any general
rules for reform of any of these instruments for the purpose
of spurring industrial innovation. Rather, the most salient
proposals would appear to be industry-specific -- for example,
particular reforms of pharmaceutical regulation.
Third, while undoubtedly in some cases there is a trade-
off between stimulus of industrial innovation and other policy
-75-
objectives, our perusal of the case studies suggests that,
in most instances, the reforms that make sense as a stimulus
to the .right kind of. innovation makes sense in terms of more
general criteria as well. Thus, while regulatory reform is
not a broad panacea for stimulating .faster or better-
directed technological advance, the kinds of reforms that
scholars long have proposed on grounds of general economic
efficiency for .pharmaceutical regulation and auto emissions
control probably would affect innovation in the right direc-
tion. Our case studies reveal a few instances where anti-
trust may be acting as a restraint on certain types of
industrial innovation, but they certainly provide no general
indictment of anti-rtrust policy on these grounds. .The anti-
trust issues involved in the suits against IBM or AT&T are
complicated.. As a general rule, however, it does not appear
that anti-trust is hobbling innovation by business. Simi-
larly, there appears to be no general magic in reform of the
patent law or in the patent policies of particular government
agencies that fund R&D. " •
Let us not be misunderstood. It may well be that estab-
lishment of a generally supportive climate for industrial
R&D is the most important thing the government can do to
facilitate industrial innovation. We would put particular
stress on. the importance of strong aggregate demand, rela-
tively stable demand growth, and predictable prices.
When business conditions are good, and incomes and
demand are growing.rapidly and predictably,'business firms
can anticipate an expanded market .and make their investment
and R&D plans accordingly. When demand is stagnant -- or
uncertain -- investment in new plant and equipment is
deterred, and R&D aimed to tap new markets may look like n
very'risky proposition, Of the industries studied in this
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report , housing is the one that is most noticeably influ-
enced by changing macroeconomic conditions. Quigley and
others have argued that the cyclical sensitivity of residen-
tial construction is an important factor explaining the
structure of the industry and the limited incentives for
innovation associated with investment in durable equipment.
However, virtually all industry is'subject to some cyclical
influences. The demand of farmers for new agricultural
implements is cyclically sensitive. A non-triv.iaJ proportion
of the demand for semi-conductors is cyclically sensitive.
Economic slumps hurt the airlines, diminish their ability
and incentive to invest in new equipment, and reduce returns
to the design and development of new aircraft.
However, even if there were no Affects on innovation,
it would be the objective of macroeconomic policy to achieve
a sustained growth, high employment, steady prices. As with
regulatory and ani.i-trust policy, the objective of stimular-^.';' ;
•ting innovation carries no particular implications for fiscal
and monetary policies. i:; :
It seems to be like this in general. If the specif ic" ;;• :.
interest is in stimulating innovation, it is a mistake to/;••;/
look largely to general-purpose policies. The design of • | ;j'. ;
them can be influenced only marginally by concerns about f;';;'.;
innovation, and often concern for innovation does not point:
to departures from policies that are sensible on more general
grounds. If "innovation" policy is to have any meaning, :• '..'•
search for one must be focused on more specialized instruments.
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D. A Brief Summing Up.
In the preceding section, we identified a wide range
of government policies that defined the .climate, influenced
incentives for, and imposed constraints on industrial
.research and development. In virtually all of our case
studies, one or more of these government policies was an:
important part of the story. However,, the most important
such policies differed from industry to industry. While it
is apparent that a number of specific.reforms might have
significant benefits, the case studies dp not seem to reveal
any general and powerful guidelines for regulatory or anti-
trust or patent policy reform. .If a serious mandate re-
emerges to find and implement government policies ..that will
significantly spur industrial innovation, debate should try
ito avoid the understandable temptation to look to modifica-
tions in these general instruments to do the trick. There,
isn't much leverage there. Moreover, the kinds of improve-
ments in macroeconomic and other policies that make most
sense for stimulating the right kind of innovation make good
sense in terms of other criteria as well.
If government must look specifically for policies that
may have a significant stimulating effect on industrial
innovation, the place to look is in the bag of R&D support
policies. This chapter has not attempted to give a general
rationale or justification for active government support of
R&D nor to draw up fine theoretical arguments to guide such
policies. A decade or so ago, economists had much clearer
and more pointed theoretical views about these matters. The
externalities from R&D and the uncertainties involved led,
according to the theoretical perspective prominent at that
time, to a divergence between the quantity of R&D expenditure
that, firms would find most profitable and the quantity that
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was optimal from ?. "social" point of view. The firms would
spend too little. Public support or subsidy therefore was
warranted and ought to be focused on those kinds of R&D and
on those industries where the.externalities and
 ;tne.uncer-
tainties were the greatest. Subsequent theoretical work
has led economists to draw a more complicated picture. A
competitive regime in which firms gain property rights on
certain of their technologies draws forth some R&P that is
socially wasteful. Major technological- uncertainties call
for a variety of approaches with open knowledge of routes
being explored and what is being found along the way, and
not a big push along one particular road. The problem with
market-induced industrial R&D allocation lies in the port-
folio—the allocation of resources -- rather than in a
total magnitude of effort.
But if the problem is not simply.characterizable as
"too little" research and development, the design of
appropriate government policies requires mechanisms to
identify the particular kinds of research,, and sometimes
the particular projects, that are being under-funded.
Therein lies the problem. Government agencies are seriously
constrained in the information they are able to marshal
directly or indirectly to guide the allocation.of public
R&D monies.
The historical experience canvassed in this study sug-
gests that there are three routes that can be followed.
One is to associate government. R&D support with- procurement
or another well-defined public objective. A second is to.
define and fund arenas of non-proprietary research and allow
the appropriate scientific community to guide R&D allocation.
The third.is to develop mechanisms whereby potential users
guide the allocation of applied research and development
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I
• funds. A fourth kind of policy, in which government
i officials try themselves to identify the kinds of projects
that are likely to be winners in a commercial market compe-
.tition, is seductive, — but the evidence collected in this
volume and other studies suggests that it is a strategy to
be avoided.
 : '
These are qualitative judgments drawn from qualitative'
and.impressionistic case studies. While we can provide
some reasoning to make them plausible, we can provide no
tidy and powerful general theoretical justification for
them. Perhaps the lesson that economists should .draw from .
their earlier attempts to base prescription for government
.R&D policy on theoretical arguments is that this is a.
dangerous game. Economic reality is too complicated to be
fit well by any simple theory. More complicated theories
generally point in differen.. p""' > -y directions, spending
on the quantitative magni !;;;»• .i in key parameters. '
The design, of good nc.' . ''His or ..id empirical research,
and not simply on • . i . _ . i ) :. v.-.'St.ining,
There arc i v.-o major weaknesses v;irh cue evidence
provide-'.: in L i s i . , study support 11. ; tho ai^ve propOKj. I j.or. 5 ,•
about policJC'S. First, tho evident' •• .:•.!•:• . .-"-lely from =
scuoies of r.t".'-'1:! I'.s. (••;'•.'••;! s ies. .- . nul, i. no < ••/> Jf.ice is I
qualitative j"ul jud^n.-.-n*. ;i '.:•••- c-.viantJ tative and toadily
ver i f iablo . ;•
Ths.s first weaV.MQSS is riot as serious as it might seem, •
although this study v/ould have been enriched had coverage
been wider. There are available a number of other industry
studies, some of the United States, some of Europe. There
are also several across-the-board evaluations of government
policies in support of industrial innovation, particularly
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policies of European countries. The conclusions drawn in
this chapter were influenced not only by the case studies
but also by this other evidence, and are consistent by ;-.nd
'' large with both bodies of data.
The second weakness is more serious. One can try to
l avoid having to base conclusions largely on qualitative
and impressionistic evidence by constructing formal models
:
 and hypotheses and.estimating and testing these • ith stati:-
; tics. To some extent this kind of work has been dc:vj for
^agriculture. But such quantitative conclusions are no better
than the models and the data on which they are based, and
-these contain large elements of the subjective and judgmental
; ; : ; We are more concerned about thu :a.it.h that lay perse, s.
1
 ; impolicy makers, and even scholars often show in quantitative
i •
 :
: ;
 conclusions drawn from shaky mode? s and data than about
. i. ^conclusions that are explicitly qualitative and judgmental.
•
 : When Our knowledge is stronger, when we understand things
:
 :
 :well enough to have confidence in the basic form of the
. .
 :
_ . • ' - •
models we write down, when we have data that are more con-
' formable with our operating models than they now are, then
quantitative studies can play a greater role. We would :
, argue, however, that, at the present time, the most promisinr
i . route towards such stronger knowledge is to pursue case
studies of the sort reviewed here and the kind of qualil: t.; »i,
i judgmental analysis developed in this chapter.
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IV. RECENT FEDERAL INITIATIVES IN CIVILIAN SECTOR.
The last chapter examined the history of t. :<hnic2l
change in U.S. industry and tried to draw from that history
•- t
lessons for government policy. This chapter looks at the more ';.
recent history of several policy initiatives for boosting ;
.• *
civilian technology — with ar. eye toward analyzing these . '
programs in light of the lessons from our case studies.
We focus primarily on three programs proposed or active
under the Carter administration —. the Cooperative Generic i
Technology Program (COGENT); the Cooperative Automotive Research
Program (CARP); and the industrial energy . . productivity
program in the Department of Energy (DOE) — that have been
eliminated under the new administration. We also discuss
more briefly some National Science Foundation efforts that
rorr.jin in. operation.
Each of these programs has features the reader of the
last chapter will find familiar; there are a few novel features
as '-/ell. Evaluation in any strong form is difficult (even for
the DCE.program which, unlike the other two, was a functioning,
and not'merely an incipient, program); but we hope to be able,
noretheless, to draw a few tentative conclusions along the way
t.h-out the programs and their effectiveness.
The discussions of the programs presented here — their
history, objectives, rationale, and methods --are based pri-
marily on published reports. But our analysis has also been
1. On the Reagan administration view of policy toward civilian-
sector RiD --and on the demise of COGENT in particular —
see Arlen J. Large, "A 'Monument1 Industry Innovation Law .
Crumbles Under Reagan Administration," The Wai1 Street
Journal, July 15, 1981, p. 34. '.' • .
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informed by interviews with both federal officials and
industry representatives, whose ideas and views were aired
during three meetings we held with senior executives from all
phases of the R&D enterprise. The first meeting (on November
30, 1979) looked to government officials .rnvolved in civilian-
sector R&D; the second meeting ;on February 22, 1980) sought
primarily the industry perspective. The third meeting —
significantly, on October 29, 1980 — brought the two groups
together. That meeting's format consisted of presentation
by senior federal officials of five programs of government
involvement in civilian-sector R&D. An audience that included
many executives from the private sector provided comments
and raised questions.
A.i The Cooperative Generic Technology Program .
: COGENT was an outgrowth of assistant Commerce Secretary
Boruch's 1979 Domestic Policy Review on innovation. The•program
was announced on October 31, 1979, as part of what was des-
cribed . alliteratively as the "President's Industrial Innovation
Initiatives."
: : Like their precursors in earlier administrations, the
Carter initiatives -- and COGENT in particular -- were intended
as (an at least partial) cure for a "lag" in U.S. technological
innovation -- and, by implication, for various macroeconomic
problems. "Increased industrial and technological innovation,"
as Congress found and declared in the legislation authorizing
COGENT, "would reduce trade deficits, stabilize the dollar,
2. C'. Section II.A. above.
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increase productivity gains, increase employment and stabi-
lire prices."
. -
'"
The key feature of this program, of course, was its
focus on "generic" technologies. As such, COGENT arguably
represented an intellectual advance over earlier schemes to
boost innovation. •
The program's operating regulations suggest cautiously
that government involvement in generic technologies is indicated
whenever cooperation within the private sector alone is "inap-
. : d -
propriate"; and the Congressional committee report is explicit
that "'generic research,' like basic research, is not likely
to attract funding from individual firms because they cannot
capture theibenefits directly." Yet, an interest in the
"generic";—• in technologies that cut across and might prove
fundamental to several industries — suggests a somewhat richer
understanding of the process of technological change than ia
implied in most externality arguments. Innovation is not
simply a matter of mechanically pumping "sufficient" or "ade-
quate" amounts of R&D funding into an existing firm or industry
and expecting it promptly to produce a proper levol of producti-
vity growth. Technical change is in fact an immensely compli-
cated process in which technologies connect together in often
3. S. 1250, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, Section 2, Paragraph 6.
Called the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of
1980 -- and now zero-funded under the Reagan administra-
tion — this bill gave the Congressional stamp of approval
to COGENT, even though the Carter administration had planned
to go forward with some form of generic technology program
anyway under existing legislative authority.
4. COGENT Regulations, 15CFR17a, published in the Federal
Register, vol. 45, no. 159, August 14, 1980, p. 54029.
5. U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, report no. 96-781, May 15, 1980, p. 8.
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6. See Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
7. U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Cooperative
Technology, "Cooperative Technology Program: Key to
Industrial Innovation," Revised Draft, January 24,
1980, p. 2.
unexpected ways and in which firms —. and entire industries —
occasionally appear and disappear. . I
• " ' " ' . ' . • ' • ' 1
In particular, advances have often been most dramatic :
when, in.a kind of space-warp across th«:i industrial structure,
a technology developed in one industry suddenly becomes appli- i
cable to a previously unsuspected wider range of industries.
This is often called "technological convergence." .
A program of generic research, under this interpretation, '•
is an attempt to anticipate and cash in on such convergence. j
The government, therefore, is not engaged in the business i
of "picking winners" — whether firms, industries, or projects j
within an industry— in a specific or Detailed way. Of course, j
the government must somehow pick "generic winners," and this
may not be as easy as suggested by COGENT program documents,
which assert with a confidence bordering on epistemological
hubris that "a study of generic technologies can identify t
latent technologies yet to be invented (or those which are
in use in" one industry but are candidates for application in
other industries) or promising new industries which do not yet
exist."7
Selecting generic technologies was in fact the first
step in the COGENT process. The Commerce Department engaged
the Industrial Research Institute Research Corporation, an
industry group, to study nine potential areas of generic
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8. Industrial Research Institute Research Corporation,
"Cooperative Technology Program: Evaluation of Nine
Candidate Areas for Industry Participation and Support,"
Revised Version, December 10, 1979. The nine original
areas studied were: automated watch manufacturing;
composite materials; welding and joining; textiles;
powder metallurgy; organic coatings; semi-conductors;
radiation processing; and corrosion. Of these, only
powder metallurgy and welding were in COGENT plans at
the time of the program's demise.
9. Comments by Lansing Felker, assistant director of COGENT,
at our October 29, 1980, meeting.
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technology. The group was charged specifically with
determining not only the technical and economic benefits
likely from pursuing each technology but also the willingness j
of industry to cooperate in each area. Based partly on this f
report, the Commerce Department at the time of COGENT's demise !
had settled on — nnd was beginning to set up projects on —
three areas: powder metallurgy, welding, and friction (or
"tribblpgy"); two other areas under consideration were
artificial intelligence and something called "near net-shaped
processing." . . j
I
|
The institutional structure of COGENT was to have been j
built around "Generic Technology Centers." Each center was l
to have been an independent entity which, although perhaps i
affiliated with a university or other institution, would none-
theless have required its own charter and by-laws as a non- j^
profit corporation. Industrial firms who wished to participate "; :
in the research were to become members of the center; each ;;;:;.
firm would send a representative to the center's board of i;
governors, and each would be assessed dues according to a i ;
formula considering such factors as the member's size and ? ; • ; '
the directness of its interest in the research. i: : i
; I
The principal function of a Center was to have been
i
the performance of "in-house" generic RtD. The program ]
regulations are insistent that most of the research be con-
ducted "in-house" in order "to take advantage of cumulative
research and problem-solving expertise." The research
agenda for a Center would have been set by its board of
governors, with an expectation that the projects chosen be
relevant to the Center's generic technology and promise results
significantly outweighing costs. '"
Centers were to have other functions as well. One of I
these was the provision of technical services, comprising } }
consulting services; information systems and data library ! \
services; training; and "technology evaluation" to monitor < ;
progress, in the generic technology. (The program regulations i
emphasize that the consultation services must "complement" . . ; • •
and not compete with private consulting services; it's far
from clear what this would -- or should —have meant in
practice.) A center was also to maintain a "strategic
planning" (capability to guide the progress of its research
agenda.
•' . . »
One interesting provision of the program regulations
stipulated that Center membership "may not be conditioned
upon adherence to agreements which unreasonably restrain
trade." This was interpreted to mean that firms could
not be required to sign, as a condition of Center membership,
agreements restricting them in their use of technical informa-
tion —or patents — developed at the Center; in their use
of technology developed elsewhere; or in the research they
themselves conduct outside the Center. The regulations also
provided that the Center disseminate its findings to members
10. COGENT Regulations, Op^ Cit., p. 54029.
11. COGENT Regulations, Og. Cit., p. 54031. (15CFR 17a8(b)
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12. Ibid. (15 CFR 17a.8(b)(2)(v).)
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at reasonable cost without discrimination; and they left,
the matter of dissemination to non-members up to the discretion
of the Center's board, with a proviso that "no significant
anticompetitive result ensue from such1decisions."
COGENT plans called for a mix of government and industry
funding. The first-year budget was to have been $5 million.
Planners viewed this contribution as "seed money," though,
' i
and anticipated.phasing out government support within five \ \
years, thus requiring each Center to become self-sustaining 1 1
• ' ? !
on members' dues, contract research, and consultation revenues. \ '
• ' • ' . • I I
• •
:
 nAlthough the program would have had in the end to stand I . •)
• i ,T
or fall on empirical grounds, the program's design had much
to recommend it on theoretical grounds.
* The notion of keeping COGENT centers independent "••
of universities might have had the effect of
establishing a healthy tension between the basic
and applied. (Cf. the case of the NACA research
center in the early aeronautics industry, as Well
as the system of sequestering agricultural and
medical research in professional schools outside
mainline university research departments.)
* The.- idea of requiring most research at a COGENT
center to be conducted "in-house" •-- thus helping
to develop a "memory" for the generic technology —
is consistent with the (desirable) objective of
developing a strong scientific base in the field.
* The system of center membership by interested
firms and the guidance of research by a board .' . .
of directors representing those members suggests
a structure that, despite initial resistance* might
ultimately have led to a successful working rela-
tionship with the private sector. .
Whether COGENT would have been effective — let alone desirable —
is probably not a question whose answer could be kncwn in
advance of actually trying out the program. Of all the les-
son u to be learned from the agricultural example, perhaps
the most important is that a successful institutional structure
comes about through a slow process of adaptation, aligning
the interests of the various groups one with another. There
is a suggestion in the COGENT planning documents that program
planners were aware of this. Many of the parameters most
crucial to the outcome of this adaptation process -- notably
the proprietary structure and patent policies of the Centers —
were left unspecified in the regulations.
In other areas, it is less clear that COGENT learned
all| the lessons of history. For example, there is no a
priori reason to suspect that the "externality" problems
COGENT was supposed to correct would have cleared up in time
for a Center to become self-sustaining after five years. The
agriculture example suggests that continued government funding
may be a key to success; and the NACA example suggests that,
were the "externality" to be conquered, it might instantly
obviate the existence of the COGENT Centers.
B. The Cooperative Automotive Research Program. .
The auto industry in recent years has become emblematic
of the sort of industrial "lag" that motivates programs for
boosting civilian technology. In December, 1978, a time
when the prob' ..TIS in the American car industry were very much
on the public mind, then-Transportation Secretary Brock Adams
suggested at a much-publicized news conference that the
goverunent ought to enter into a massive effort to "re-invent
the car."
What emerged from the resulting furor in Washington and
Detroit was CARP, a program whereby industry and government
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The Carter administration held a conference in February,
1979, attended by some 700 scientists and engineers, to talk
about directions for basic automotive research. Then,.in May,
1979, Carter met at the White House with the heads of the
domestic car companies to discuss the principles of what be-
came CARP.
Under CARP — which has been entirely dismantled by tha
new administration — the government and the car makers would
have jointly funded research projects in twelve general areas:
combustion, thermal, and fluid sciences; structural mechanics;
electrochemistry; aerodynamics; materials; control systems;
tribology; I acoustics; surface science and catalysis; environ-
mental science; biomedical science; and behavioral science.
The administration .had worked up a lengthy research agenda in
each area based on advisory reports from a team of industry,
university, and government scientists,
CARP was to be a "50/50 sharing arrangement." But it :
would not have involved joint or cooperative research in a
literal sense. Auto companies were independently to fund basic
research projects, which could take place "in-house," in uni-
versity labs, or in government facilities as each company saw
fit. For all such projects deemed "countable" .by a CARP
Oversight Committee (in light of the aforementioned twelve
categories), the government would have funded -- aqually
independently — a matching amount of research whose type and
location would have been at government discretion. Program
13. This report was published in The Congressional Record,
Senate, Sept. mber, 1980, pp.S12813-Sl2834.
)
I
technologies.
would jointly fund basic research on automotive-related !
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planners described the approach, as "decentralized" and
"pluralistic."14
The $12 million slated for the first year of operation
had included no contribution from the private sector; but pro-
gram planners had hoped to "ramp up" to $100 million per year
in three to five years, with half of that coding from the
15domestic auto makers. Each manufacturer was to have been
assessed an canount in proportion to its market-share.
The Department of Transportation was to have been the
lead agency for CARP, allocating 60 percent of the government
research funds; the National Science Foundation was to have
control of the remaining 40 percent.
As of November, 1980, four domestic auto makers —
Ford, Chrysler, American Motors, and Volkswagen of America --
had agreed to participate. General Motors was somewhat recal-
citrant. Since a CAHP without GM would have been a bit like
Hamle-c without the Prince, this created problems from the start.
GM's reasons for discontent are unclear, but seemed to involve
uncertainty about antitrust, implications and skepticism about
the program's ability to c.llocate technical resources .
effectively. It was equally unclear as to whether GM's hold-
out was intended merely to maximize its influence on the shape
of a program it expected ultimately to accede to -- a strategy
perhaps involving the suspicion that Jimmy Carter would not
long remain in office — or whether GM had no intentions of
ever signing on. .
14. See, e.g.. testimony of Philip M. Smith, Associate
Director of the President's Office of Science and
Technology.Policy, before the Senate Subcommittee on
Scierce, Technology and Space, April 30, 1980, p.5.
15. Op. Cit., p. . 12.
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As was the case with COGENT, the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission gave their assurances that
participation in CARP would not plunge a firm into anti-
trust difficulties. Patent provisions for the fruits
of CARP-sponsored research were never fully worked out,
although the basic research character of the program made
these concerns somewhat less pressing. CARP planners articu-
lated the principle of "wide and open dissemination of results
to all interested parties subject to the appropriate patent
provisions."
Although also aimed at "generic" technologies in some
sense,;CARP was a program with far less institutional detail
than COGENT. Indeed, it seems to harken back to earlier
approaches to stimulating industry through R&D, implicitly
suggesting that the problem in the car industry stems from
an "insufficient" level of basic research by car firms. Ex-
cept for specifying a review board to pass on research projects,
the design of CARP was almost studiously non-institutional in
character; and one might almost be forgiven for applying to
CARP the uncharitable cliche that it intended merely to "throw
money at the problem,"
Those who would contemplate similar efforts in the
future might well wish to create a structure somewhat closer
tc the COGENT model.
16. Op. Cit., p. 9.
17. Op. Cit,, p. 5.
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C. The DOE Industrial Energy Program.
18The DOE industrial energy productivity prograu. was
similar to COGENT in that it was concerned at least in part
with "generic" technologies — in this case technologies that
could be applied to save energy in a number of industries.
The program" differed from COGENT (and CARP) not.only in that
19it was an operating program at the time of its demise but
also in that it did not confine itself merely to directed
basic research.
Part of President Carter's National Energy Plan, the
industrial energy program was intended to speed the introduc-
tion *of energy-saving technologies in industry. The program
operated on the theory that, although increased energy prices
had already spurred industry to a 9.7 percent average effi-
ciency improvement between 1972 and 1976, all the easy
solutions had been exhausted; future results "would depend
principally on larger capital investments and major process
changes- " The DOE approach to this perceived'problem was
to contribute government funds to commercial research,
development, or demonstration projects to develop new energy-
saving technology.
The program had two principal thrusts. The first, which
could be described as "generic" in focus, was toward "wide-
application projects." Such projects were to "improve the
energy efficiency of processes and equipment that are common
18. The full correct title is the Federal Industrial Energy
Conservation Research, Development, and Demonstration
Program.
19. , The program was zero-funded under the Reagan budget.
20. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Conservation and
Solar Applications, The DOE Industrial Conservation
Program; A Partnership in Saving Energy, Washington,
D.C., no date, p.6.
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to many industries.". Examples included wasca-heat utili-
zation (e.g., high-temperature recuperator systems, .indust-
rial heat pumps, etc.); alternative materials (e.g.., coal as
a feedstock for acetylene); and advanced cogeneration. The
second.thrust was toward "industry-specific projects," which
were intended "to, increase the efficiency of processes used
by the most energy-intensive industries, and to achieve the
substitution of abundant fuels for oil and natural gas -in
22these industries." The target industries included steel,
aluminum, glass, and cement (high-temperature processes);
textiles, paper, and general product manufacturing (low-
temperature processes); and agricultural and food processes.
The program also boasted a third and more vaguely defined
thrust — "technology deployment" -- which involved planning
for the market penetration of new technologies.
Although the program's literature .is littered with what
are fairly dubious justifications for government involvement —
e.g., that "capital is scarce" or that firms tend to weigh
a dollar saved on energy equally with ;-.. dollar saved else-
where — the program ultimately rested its justification
on fairly solid economic ground— or on what, at any rate,
was regarded a few years _go as solid ground. The basic
notion was that DOE should contribute public funds to an R&D.
project only when the project would otherwise be "too risky"
for a private firm to undertake unaided. More precisely,
they implicitly argued that social rates of return may diverge
from private rates because a firm is risk-averse whereas
society as a whole should be risk-neutral; therefore, government
21. OJD. Cit. , pp. 16-17,
22. . Op. Cit., pp. 17-20,
23. Oj>. Ci_t. , pp. 7-8.
24. The economic models from which this risk-aversion argument
derive are closely related in for.n and assumptions to the
appropriability-externality models discussod. in Section II.C.
above. See especially Kenneth Arrow and Robert Lind,
"Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment,"
American Economic Review, Juno, J970.
25. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Conservation and
Solar Applications, "Industrial Energy Conservation Program
Project Evaluation-Threshold Analysis." Washington, D.C.
mimeo.
•24 • i
slv"?.d get involved whenever risk-aversion ia suspected. j
This pMlosophy of intervention was formalized by DOE in a •{,.
25 •
computerized project-selection technique, which calculated j
the expected return.and riskiness of each project; DOE would ;i
funJ only projects with an acceptable rate of return who.»e ;
riskiness placed them outside the domain of likely private j
sponsorship. The probabilities employed in this procedure •
were estimated by DOE on the basis of technical, commercial, ]
and institutional factors. Each applicant was also required '1
to assert that it would not have carried out the projec'c in j •
i 5question in the absence of government assistance. • ;
'. ' - t i
: . ' . i
The program included no provision for the beneficiary . " j
of the P.&D support to repay DOE in the event of "a successful |
project. ;The federal share in projects was typically 30 ;
percent. Program budget obligations were $21.7 million in ;
fiscal 1978 and $36.3 million in 1979. The program's goal ' •'•
- ;; " : • *
was a 3.2 quadrillion Etu/year energy saving in 1985.
Like; CARP, the DOE program wa& also arguably based on
 :
an older ir.odel of government intervention, one which, despite
its partial:focus on the "generic," ultimately involved the
government, in "picking winners" and evaluating particular ;
research projects. Nonetheless, the DOE program seams by all
indications to have been an effective program, in that it was
embraced and utilized by the private sector.
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k* The National Science foundation Programs.
In the years immediately.after World War II, some 12
percent of university research was funded by industry. The
figure today is closer to 3 or 3V percent (although it is
increasing). This signals a breakdown in communication bet-
ween business and academe, according to Dr. Jack Sanderson,
Assistant Director for Engineering and Applied Science at
NSF." (This directorate has since been renamed the
Engineering Directorate.)
In 1972, NSF began establishing industry/university
cooperative research centers* Examples in operation include
the polymer center at MIT, the "submicron"- center at Cornell,
and the rather ill-fated furniture center in North Carolina.
The main difference between these centers and those proposed
for COGENT seemed to be that NSF centers are affiliated with
universities. .
A slightly different kind of center funded by NSF is
an "innovation center" aimed at teaching entrepreneurial
skills to engineering students. There is evidently a project
26. Remarks at our October 29, 1980, meeting.
27. For a fuller discussion of NSF1s cooperative research
program, see Neal H. Brodsky, Harold Kaufman^ and John
. Tooker, University/Industry Cooperation, New York:
Center for Science and Technology Policy, 1980, pp. 34-41
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A primary reason for the program's success seems to
be its concentration on process innovation, which limited
the uncertainties primarily to technological and engineering-
economic — as oppop..jd to commercial 6r marketing — areas.
Competent manageme.it and a low profile were undoubtedly j
important ingredients A S well. - ' • - . . ' j
along these lines in operation at the University of Utah.
NSF also retains a small-business project, in which
firms with an innovative idea in need of development can
receive support. An important requirement of the program
is that applicants have venture capital already lined up
to finance the developed idea if it proves successful.
NSF was also to have been involved in the CARP program
(it was to allocate 40 percent of the funds initially)/ lend-
ing its expertise in university research matters to the
Department of Transportation, which was ultimately to have
taken full charge of CARP. Another NSF venture" is a project
to refit the infamous Glomar Explorer for experimental oil
drilling in the deep ocean and Continental Margin areas.
Sanderson also mentioned projects in robotics and fluid-bed
combustion.
: ; Another part of NSF attempting to increase communica-
tion between the academic and the industrial is the Joint
University-Industry Research Program. Frederick Betz, who
heads the program, described himself as a sort of "banker"
with a pot o: money for research projects jointly undertaken
' • "* 8by university and industrial scientists.'' The procedure
isithis. A proposal involving joint efforts of both industry
and university is submitted to the segment of NSF appropriate
to the project's topic; the proposal then undergoes peer
review; successful proposals then go to Detz for funding under
this program. (NSF funds only the university share; industry
picks up the tab for its researchers.): This is now being changed,
The program was funded at a level of $5 million in FY78,
increasing to $7 million in 1979. Unlike CARP, COGENT, and the
DOE industrial program, the NSF programs were not cut completely
by the Reagan administration.
28. Remarks at our October 29, 1.980, meeting,
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V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON MAJOR THEMES.
What type of conclusions does one derive from a study
based largely upon anecdotal experiences and judgments?
A nurober of important themes have emerged from our study
of recent federal initiatives, from a number of the industry
studies, and from the comments of industry and/or government
executives. They have surfaced in the analyses of both
government science policy and industrial research. Thus, a
primary type of "conclusion" is the identification and signi-
ficance of ;these important themes, placed in a perspective
that permits us to take them into proper account for the form-
ulation of future policies and the initiation of future
programs.; ;= ; .
There is a second type of "conclusion" one can draw
from these common themes and from the anecdotal data of this
study. We: can set down statements about the interactions of
public and private sectors that appear to characters ze desirable
or effective relationships for federal support of civilian
R&D — statements that can serve as criteria to guide future
actions.
The perspectives derived from this study consist of a
number of fairly simple principles or observations drawn from
the evolution of, and recent experiences in, public- and private-
sector interactions, along with evaluations of the several
principal themes. We ivill therefore consider the general
principles that apply to the present status of civilian-sector
R&D as one theme, and address separately the other individual
topics, although some of the general principles will refer
briefly to subjects discussed more fully as specific themes.
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A. General Principles for Public- and Private-Sector
R&D Interactions
It is important to state first those aspects of the !
civilian-sector R&D structure that are most critical to the , |
effectiveness of federal activity. Every Western industrialized •:
country has developed a pattern of government involvement in (
•i
civilian-sector P.&D. But there are two factors which, taken !
. . !
together, apply to the situation in the United States to a !
far greater degree than to the other countries of the OECD j
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development): . ;
. • ' • • - • ' . - . . . • ' . • • . . . . ' . . . .'••: '
1. The private sector has the responsibility in ''
almost all areas, subject to boundary conditions ,
set by government, for the.manufacture and dis-
tribution of goods and services for the civilian
sector. It thus has the primary responsibility .
for investment and marketing decisions related
to the exploitation of technical change.
2. Industrial research funded by the private .
sector constitutes a very sizable resource
in absolute terms ($33.9 billion in 1981)
and as a percent of the total national R&D
expenditures (49 percent in 1981). The amount
of R&D conducted within industry — both industry
and government-supported.-- is far more substan-
tial ($49.2 billion and 71 percent of the total
in 1981) .L • • .
We therefore have a picture of the private sector in
the U:S. as relatively self-sufficient in its ability to
generate the R&D it requires for growth. The industrial
research conducted within the private sector is surrounded
by a wealth of technical activities throughout the world
that are not necessarily intended for its support, and by a
number of federally-funded activities that are. The linkages
through which the private sector extracts benefits from this
broad technical reservoir are generally loose and informal,.
1. Willis H. Shapley, ef. al., eds., Research and Development:
AAAS Report VI, Washington: American Association f.or the
Advancement of Science, 1981, p. 87.
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based more on professional interactions than on mechanisms
set.up for deliberate exchanges.
It is in this broad context that we must consider the
actions of the federal government and the reactions of the'
private sector. When we consider federal support of civilian-
sector R&D, there is the implicit assumption that the technical
activity supported is expected to be converted to use, i.e.,
it will be integrated by some mechanism into the operations I i
i
of the private sectort emerging in the form of new products, ! i
processes, and services.
This is why the question of improving the effective-
ness: of federal support for civilian-sector R&D turns upon | i
theimore fundamental question of whether the federal ! :
government should engage in a specific area, .particularly ; ; ; : : : : • - , > .
when the private sector is relatively self-sufficient and • ; • ; !
must balance technical change with financial and marketing •• I -5
resources. Given the implicit desire for conversion to use, j ;;.' ;
an action that should not be engaged in by the federal j;.;;;. '
government by this judgment will very probably not turn out i H i :
to b-? an effective action. That, in fact, is a principal M;:: •
historical observation emerging from the analysis of industry JHN
and individual experiences during this study. 5 :
This provides a working model with which to extract ; ; . ' • ;
some general principles from the material assembled in this
 / h :
study. Federal support of civilian-sector R&D must develop
appropriate linkages with the private sector so that our
economy can derive the benefits from that support. On this
basis, we can now set down a number of general principles
illustrated by these materials.
* The economic basis for government involvement
in civilian-sector R&D should be seen as
involving more than merely an assessment of
the "social returns" to various levels of R&D
funding.
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Economic theory in recent years has begun to realize j
that the process of technical change in industry is a com-. . j
plex one, and that the rationale for government involvement
is more than a simple matter of the sufficiency or insuffi-
ciency of private R&D funding. The important problem —
economists are increasingly recognizing —is the identifi-.
cation of which technologies and types of projects are
insufficiently supported by the private sector. And programs
for government involvement in R&D thus must be attentive to
the mechanism proposed for the allocation of federal resources
t o R&D. ' • ' . . ,
*'•'•. There must be widespread support for the need
for a federal role in supporting a specific
; •' program of civilian-sector R&D.
;This is the common-sense doctrine stated at the
beginning of this section. For any proposed policy of
action,! there must be a logic as to the propriety for the
particular action by the federal government. Further, there
should be a reasonable agreement as to this need on the part
of all interested parties.
* Technical change in almost every industry
sector can be influenced by some federal
action.
There is not, and has not been, a neat separation
between the private-sector pursuit of technical change and
the actions of the federal government. The amount of feder-
ally funded R&D conducted by each industry may vary, but this
is not the main principle at issue here. The point is that
the range of federal actions, including procurement and tax
policies as well as the direct support of R&D, is so wide
that it has been a factor in technical change throughout
industry at many times in our history. The image of an in-
dustry planning, conducting, and exploiting all the technical
change it requires independently of any interaction with the
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.•iJ
federal government is not a realistic picture of the
actual growth of U.S. industrial technology.
* Effective federal R&D involvement is related to
a federal role as user or supplier.
• • v -' ' ' 5
Selecting the highest-priority research programs, j
setting the most realistic objectives, and integrating the ?
results in the manufacture and use of a product or process -- j
all of these functions are expedited by some familiarity j
with product specifications or market needs. The familiarity j
is possessed by those who buy and use it. Thus, the out-
standing successes of federal R&D activities during and after
World War II were in those fields in which the federal govern-
ment itself was the customer.
* Support for civilian-sector R&D should be ; '.
industry-specific.
' ' - . " . . . • ' • . - . ' . ' . ' '
The varying characteristics of each industry (cf. j
Chapter II.B.) define the relative importance of technical j
change in the growth and Competitive relations for that ;
industry. They also indicate which category of research /
may be lacking, whether there is .a role for government to
fill a void, and whether the capabilities and opportunities
for exploiting technical change are present. The use of :
direct or indirect instruments of government support will :
depend critically on these characteristics. Federal suppott
for R&D in the metal and mining industry, for example, should
be radically different from any such support in microelec-
tronics. . ' • • . '
* Federal R&D activity is most effective and least
controversial in strengthening the infrastructure • /- •
of science and technology.
There is reasonable consensus and a sound rational
argument for the federal government to be concerned with
the health of the national technical enterprise. Such con-
sensus and rationale disappear quickly when federal support
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for R&D turns to specific missions, even to specific
industries, which call for considerations of economic and
market factors, and can disrupt the competitive actions
within the industry in both domestic and international
markets.
* Federal support for civilian-sector applied
research is more likely to be effective when
coupled with some indirect federal action, ;
such as procurement. ii
The fundamental weakness in federal support for civilian- :
sector R&D is the lack of coupling to the manufacture and 1i
use of products or processes derived from technical change. j
Thus, government agencies are at a disadvantage in assigning j
priorities, setting specifications, and achieving successful «
transfer of the results. But when there is an overriding
national objective that justifies government procurement of i: '
various civilian goods and technologies, the government is •; : '\
' " ' , ' • • • • * \ ' • ' • - . \
in;a much better position to understand the technical and |:| ; ;
market parameters; and government R&D support coupled to |i-' .; .
this procurement can help spur technical change in the civi- • l\'\ :
lian sector while serving its own procurement goals. M ;
; : ' . * Civilian-sector R&D derives benefits from l^-I
the stronger technical infrastructure and ji ;;':;
increased reservoir of science and technology ••'. \
provided by public-sector R&D. ;
Programs conducted by and for the civilian-sector — ;; .
pur very considerable body of industrial research — have
access to a higher level of science and technology because
of the continuing public-sector technical efforts, e.g.,
by NASA and Department of Defense. Thus, the technical efforts
of the civilian sector itself -is more effective for those
personnel engaged in its research. The level of knowledge
for new graduates, particularly those with graduate degrees
who have experienced some research op«rations, is higher in
part because of public-sector R&D.
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* Federal support of. civilian-sector R&D is more
effective when there is reasonable involvement
of the industry sector concerned.
This is the fundamental rule for coupling government
i
efforts to the system which must integrate and convert j
technical activities to useful products, processes, and \ ]•
services. The nature of the programs and of the national ']
objectives may justify government involvement, but industry
inputs and activities can be a critical factor in planning,
condticti-ng, and transferring R&D. When national objectives
appear to preclude such government-industry cooperation,
the results will surely be less effective and more expensive.
* i Successful federal support of mission-oriented
civilian-sector R&D must be compatible with .
, existing technical community. ,
Success implies transfer to use. Construction of a
final prototype or pilot plant resulting from a major program,
the ability to manufacture something economically -- these
things require a particular level of technical capabilities
in fields of materials, controls, chemical engineering, and
so on. Federal efforts in a public-sector mission can and
do finance the parallel programs required to implement R&D.
Federal efforts in a civilian-sector mission must rely upon
the existence of the appropriate technical skills in industry.
The appropriate balance of knowledge and capabilities is
a critical factor in any program, and one that is normally
not within the control of the federal government in civilian-
sector missions.
B. Support for Infrastructure of Science and Technology.
The most pervasive, acceptable and effective form of
federal support for civilian-sector R&D is strengthening of
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n
V ; ' • ' • • . • . • • . : ' . • - - , . ! !
the technical infrastructure. This means:
1. Support of mechanisms to provide trained
technical graduates.
2. Increasing the reservoir of-science and technology.
These activities ara conducted typically in non-
industrial institutions. Our comments thus are focussed
primarily on universities and government laboratories.
However, new forms of mission-oriented research institutes
or other mechanisms have been considered for pursuit of
broad generic technologies, e.g., welding, and these could r
be established as independent institutions, possibly with \
ties to universities. . ''•-•'.'
Any federal involvement in civilian-sector R&D repre-
sents a separation between the funding source and the user.
Support of basic research or generic technology creates a
further separation between the general nature of R&D being
conducted and the specific needs of product and process
requirements within industry. Thus, particular issues arise
concerning priorities for research programs and transfer
of results. .
. There is general consensus within industry and, indeed,
within the entire technical community that a proper govern-
ment role exists for supporting infrastructure R&D. There
is no consensus on mechanisms; on criteria for establishing
priorities; on relations among funding agency, R&D producer,
and user; on provisions for proprietary positions; on trans-
fer mechanisms. Public consensus about the role may mask
serious differences about approaches and effectiveness, ;
These issues raise questions and potential conflicts
for the university. Our data base for this subject arises
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.1
partly from the interviews within this study, and even
more from a parallel study on university-industry research
cooperation by the NYU Center for Science and Technology
Policy. Anecdotal and quantitative data are contained in j j
a report currently being submitted to the National Science j !
Foundation under Contract No. NS3-80-24731, titled University-
Industry Cooperation; The Examination of Existing Mechanisms.
MThe emphasis of universities on basic research, and - ]
; i
the fact that the university is a third-party-in any • 1 ;
government-indrstry interaction, define the strengths and
weaknesses of the university as a component in civilian-
sector R&D. Let us consider this three-way system in more
deta i1.
;•; There is a clear consensus among universities, industry,
and the federal government that university research is strong- !
est and most compatible with the functions and obligations j
of; a university when it is devoted to basic research. There j!
have been no substantial considerations from within the ?
university or industrial communities to move the university I
systems toward applied research. But there !ias been some |
evidence of misunderstanding within the leJeral rjovernment i;
and of concern within tha university community about the
various expressions of interest in "supporting" industrial ;i
needs, in providing new ideas to stimulate "innovation," ;j
 ;
that have .arisen in recent years.
There have indeed been several attempts within the
history of the National Science Foundation, for example, to
establish programs that would support applied research, most
of which would i.ave been conducted at universities. To the
extent that such activities were addressed to some need in
our national technical effort, they are within the legitimate
mission of the Foundation. However, to the extent that such :
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activities are perceived to be a response to the needs
and desires of industry, such efforts are e. misunderstanding
of the preferred relationships between university and
industry.
When they -^.re articulated at all, expressions.of.
industry preferences for changes in traditional university
procedures fall loosely into two categories. One is a desire
to strengthen basic engineering sciences in addition to the
basic physical sciences. The other is a wish to strengthen
interactions in general so that university basic research
can be planned with at least a knowledge of'those areas of
science in which industry can indentify a need for more
effort, h" . ' ! " . ' ' . ' . ' ' . ' . •' .
Thus, any actions of the federal government to support
civilian-sector R&D through funding of basic research at
universities would be in line with the expectations and
understanding of industry. Having stated this, it is also
clear that there are strong opinions within industry and
universities as to how such actions can be most effective.
These separate ccnmunities are not in complete agreement
on the most desirable conditions, but the area of disagree-
ment may not be as wide £s the caricatures of university
and industry approaches might suggest, and there are indi-
cations that such disagreements are lessening.
There are clear examples of this within the university
structure. Many of these issues that appear disturbing to
the basic physical sciences have long been resolved in those
departments and schools which have a tradition of partner-
ship with associated industries.
Thus, agricultural research and medical research have
had important linkages with the relevant components of the
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food and pharmaceutical industries. Engineering depart-
ments in general have close research ties with the chemical,
mechanical, and electrical industries. There appears to
be an accepted equilibrium among research support from
industry, graduate training, and freedor. of research.
Probably the simplest comment of this section would be that
the universities themselves would profit by studying the
mechanisms used by the professional schools in developing
relationships with the users of their research and their
education.
. » . .. ' -
At the start of this section, we suggested that both
strength and weakness are inherent in these two university
characteristics: (1) that the emphasis is on basic research
and (2) that the university is a third party in any program
of federal support of civilian-sector R&D; These statements
should be clarified.
The strengths are obvious. It is valuable to have
an institution which can pursue new frontiers of knowledge
with some continuity without an imperative for near-term
payoffs. The limitations inherent in strongly mission-
oriented institutions could inhibit the pursuit of new
directions and militate against longer-term commitments
and risk-taking. The third-party independence of universi-
ties is some insurance of objectivity, thus minimizing
considerations of past commitments or biases related to
traditional procedures that could influence the choice of
technical options.
But characteristics that provide strength in the.
independent pursuit of new knowledge can be sources of
weakness for the integration of technical progress into
social and economic systems, i.e., the civilian-sector.
There are finite resources available for any activity,
including basic research. Thus choices are being made
constant?, y on allocations to fields of research, to depart-
ments, to specific projects, and so on. These allocations
s
are made at many decision levels: within a university, |
within a federal agency, within a private corporation, ;
indeed within the mind of an individual researcher. <
.<
Stated simply, not all areas of basic research are
equally likely to be of value to all technical needs of the
civilian sector. Any advance in basic science or engineer-
ing can lead to further advances and future benefits, unex- (
. . . • j
pected.; And serendipity is a valid fact of oasic research,
given that unplanned application of results can follow any
research effort. Nevertheless, the current need to develop
alternate secure economic sources of raw materials, including . -
pursuit of ocean mining, is more likely to be aided by basic
research in process metallurgy and geophysics than by basic
research in the atomic structure of alloys, to take an
example from the materials field.
How dc we achieve greater compatibility between the
distribution of basic research within universities and the
needs of the civilian sector for basic science and engineer-
ing? Should wa try to influence this distribution .in ordar
to derive the optimum value for society from such activities?
The answer, presumably, is that there is no reason
to select either the extreme of pure randomness for university
research or of a completely detailed allocation system by
fields and projects. There can obviously be a realistic
balance between (1) undirected basic research, supported
principally on the criteria of good research, growth of a
field, and quality of the researcher; and (2) directed basic
research, supported on these criteria plus the relevance
of subject matter to needs of society, in practice, to the :
objectives of the sponsoring organization. j
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To achieve such a balance requires, in addition to
mai«y intellectual capacities, a healthy communication system
that brings university researchers in reasonable contact -I
with the system for integration of technical change into >
the civilian-sector. It i-; here that .the third-party nature j
of universities, a fundamental requirement for freedom of
inquiry and independent action, can be a barrier to the
necessary linkages that should exist between university
research and those institutions which can extract benefits
from it. The challenge lies in overcoming the inherent
disadvantages of non-involvement while preserving the inher- . ...
ent virtues of independence and objectivity.
This is of particular importance to the specific
subject of this study. That is, when the federal government
funds university research as a means of strengthening
civilian-sector R&D, there is a particular obligation to
develop appropriate linkages among all three sectors. Great
interest is evident today in university-industry research
cooperation. While much of this interest derives from pos-
.sible misunderstandings as to who needs whom and for what,
there is a solid legitimate function that such interaction
fulfills. At the very least, it is an important factor in ]
achieving the allocation of national efforts in basic . !
research that will accomodate both the traditional indepe'nd- 3
once of university research and the needs of the civilian
sector as represented by industry. Details on all of these
issues are provided in the study referred to for the
National Science Foundation.
There is a continuing and, we believe, healthy period
of experimentation and self-examination now underway within
universities and within the external institutions concerned
with university research, namely, federal agencies and indus-
trial research. The objective is to help universities', to
-no- . - : ;
• '• • • ' -J
provide the optimum contribution to the technical progress
of society. It calls for interdisciplinary research when
all .the incentives of the university system are in opposi- '_
tion. It calls for close relations with industry even
though the traditional university researcher considers
"relevance" to be irrelevant, if not improper. It calls
for federal funds to shore up the financial structure of
universities when there is equal concern for the independence
of university actions.
• . . • - - • • • • • • • • • • . . - . .
There is no fundamental incompatibility among the
legitimate scientific and technical interests and objectives
of the three sectors. There is a genuine concern on the
part of both government and industry executives to achieve
improved linkages with university research without damage
to .;lts true strength for individual research, for explora-
tory efforts in new directions, for independent action. r
The many initiatives being considered and tried will broaden :!; '••
the; exposure and thinking of all groups. That alone will ;;
be ;a major step to increase the effectiveness of university fj:
research with regard to the civilian-sector. ji !;
i The broad agreement on "infrastructure R&D" follows H
a general belief that the government's role is most effective j ;|
and legitimate when it does indeed strengthen the infra- . j :
structure of science and technology. it is most ineffective
 ;: •
and questionable the more it touches on design, on conversion
 ;:
to use, and on issues involving econom rs and markets. It :•
is not so much the simple distinction between basic research
and product development. Rather, it is more an issue of
providing a stronger base for advances by many interests
without favoring any one.
The more basic -- the less the research is related
to .specific end items -- the more willingness there is for
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priorities to be set by the research scientist and the
funding agency. The more applied — the more the research
relates to an identifiable need for understanding and data —
the greater the desire for participation by the. user.
Thus, the theme that government should support basic
or generic programs is tempered by the caution that the
precise subject matter should suggest the best mechanisms ]
and conditions of such support. That, in part, is the j
lesson of COGENT. \
'. •• '
C. Role of Indirect Fedex'al Actions.
This : study was focused upon direct federal support
of civilian-sector R&D. Yet, as the accompanying industry
studies have reminded us, federal, influence on technical
change is ^ exerted through a wide range of indirect instru-
ments of federal policy.
The particular observation we wish to emphasize here
is the effectiveness of federal R&D programs when coupled
with indirect actions of the federal government. The classic
instrument is procurement, and the great success stories
lie in the public sector. These provide lessons to support
observations from the industry studies and from individuals
interviewed that can be instructive for the civilian-sector.
It is clear from our experiences from World War II
to the present that federal R&D programs in areas where the
government is the final customer have been very effective
in technical achievement, transfer, and use. The two prin-
cipal factors for this success are:
1. Minimum uncertainty regarding market acceptance
and financial resources for conversion and use.
-112-
2- Sufficient familiarity with the user needs to • !
guide technical specifications and set priority •
for technical program. • ;
These are guidelines for any successful R&D program.
They are often lacking in federal R&D programs intended to
support the civilian sector. Nevertheless, they have been |
present in some areas with positive results.
. The examples most commonly and properly referred to
are in aircraft and electronics. Federal support for R&D.
coupled with procurement for government use led to consider-
able technical change in those industries. " The success in
achieving useful technical change derived classically from
government familiarity based upon government needs, plus
the economic underpinning provided by procurement. The
nature of these industries, which were able to commercialize
advances at the leading edge of their technologies, permitted ^
effective transfer.
• The-example'of synthetic fuels points up the possible
conflict between effectiveness and desirability. Federal
R&D programs in synthetic fuels can be made more effective
when procurement of a plant or of output is involved.
Whether in fact the synthetic fuel program is a desirable
national objective must be addressed as a separate issue.
Certainly, procurement should not be used simply to increase
effectiveness of federal support for RiD, thought it miaht
well have that result.
A program not analyzed in this study, but relevant,
is the former Experimental Technology Incentive Program
(ETIP) within the Department of Commerce. Experiments
conducted within ETIP demonstrated clearly that federal
procurement, operating in part to create demand, in part .
to establish specifications, could indeed lead to desired
technical change. It is a powerful tool when used cons-
tructively.
• - • ' • • . • ' -113- ' • ' ' . • " ' ' ' • . • • • • •
The interesting point that emerges, therefore, is
that federal support for R&D when coupled with procurement
can be effective in generating technical change in areas
where the government is not the principal user.
It is reasonable to expect a similar conclusions for
the combined use of other indirect mechanisms as, for example,
regulations. Again, we should not confuse effectiveness with
desirability. Nevertheless, a current major study being
</
completed by the Office of Technology Assessment on the
influence of regulations on innovation suggests that such
actions provide both the climate and familiarity to improve
effectiveness of federal R&D programs. !l
D. Significance of Public-Sector R&D to the Civilian-Sector.
> This study is focused on actions of the federal
government in supporting R&D intended for the civilian-sector.
We have not been concerned with indirect mechanisms or with
!indirect technology transfer.
: Nevertheless, our ultimate underlying interest is with
the forces that produce technical change in the civilian
sector, and with their relative effectiveness. The companion
set of industry studies contained many examples of the role
of indirect federal mechanisms such as procurement, regula-
tion, and taxes. For the sake of completeness in discussing
important factors — but with no pretense of depth — we
would like to present some perspectives concerning the role
of federal support of R&D not intended for the civilian
sector. These emerge both from the industry studies and
from the discussions with government and industry executives
throughout this study.
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The principal areas of public sector R&D are in
defense, space and, at least in an oarlier period, atomic
energy. Defense and space R&D constitute more than 60 per-
cent of all federal R&D expenditures in 1980. Hence,
there has been a continuing concern from many quarters about
"spin-off" cr "fall-out" or "technology transfer." These
concerns go back at least to the end of World War II, when
the sheer magnitude of federal R&D programs stimulated inter-
est in deriving further benefits beyond that of national
security.: j
This has led to two extreme schools of thought. One
is that the hundreds of billions of federal R&D dollars spent
since 1950 in public sector areas constitute a gold mine
of technical leads, of products and processes, of patents ;
that could feed into the civilian-sector if only we would
process ;the ore. The other is that R&D conducted for public- ;
sector objectives without regard to civilian-sector specifi- j
• : • i
cations is inherently of little immediate value for transfer,
requiring more effort to convert and adapt for civilian pur- ,
poses than to develop the desired technologies from scratch. ;
A corollary to this second school is that the fraction of
national R&D efforts devoted to public-sector programs
 ;
constitutes a drag on the availability of technical options
to improve productivity, economic growth, and international
competitiveness.
The common-sense observations derived from careful
review of different industry sectors is that the answer is
a bit of both. If anything, somewhat more value should be
attributed to the role of public-sector R&D than has been
accepted as "common knowledge" in recent years. To expand
on this, let us consider the several categories in which
we can view potential impact on the civilian-sector from
these activities.
2. Shapley, et. al. , Op_. Cit. , p. 17.
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The following is somewhat oversimplified in order
to provide a brief overvitw of this broad subject. We
can consider the imj/act of public-sector R&D on the
civilian-sector in these three areas:
1. Technical developments that support certain
specific industry sectors. The role of NASA
. and DOD has been critical,- and of great but
not easily calculable economic value, to
electronics, aircraft, and communications.
2. Wide-spread strengthening of the scientific
and engineering infrastructure of the nation.
This includes (a) advances in knowledge
throughput the technical spectrum of basic
sciences, electronics materials, structures,
energy conversion, and so on; (b) expansion
of university capabilities in both faculty
and facilities; (c) c\dvances in the tools of
science and technology — instrumentation,
standards, automation, computers.
3. Specific output of new materials, products>
instrumentation or processes that can "spin-
off" into civilian-sector applications.
It is this third item that has received primary atten-
tion as a potential source of considerable value for industry
adaptation to civilian-sector use, and which has been consis-
tently disappointing to those who considered such conversion
to be easy or cheap. Conversely, the first and second items,
while appreciated and taken for granted, have.probably been
somewhat underestimated with regard to their pervasive and
long-term economic values. .
These issues take on more critical importance in the
current situation in which direct federal support for
civilian-sector R&D is being de-emphasized while R&D related
to defense.is being increased. There will surely be poten-
tial economic benefits from the increased reservoir of
technical advances and technical personnel plus the specific
contributions to technical change from programs such as
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VHSIC (Very High Speed Integrated Circuits). There will
be sonie changes in overall industrial productivity, some
new product innovation, and some effects on the balance of
international trade. Will changes be more positive because
of these public-sector programs than would have occurred
if a greater fraction of such federal support had been ear-
marked for the civilian-sector?
No easy quantitative answer is possible. It may
well be that the value of the public-sector programs for
the private sector, while largely indirect, has been under-
estimated, at least within the United States. This point
should be studied in more depth. Personal observations of
the authors are that European analysts tend to assign great
credit to our defense and space programs for much of the
overall industrial progress of the United States in recent
years. Presumably the primary source of these benefits
derives from one or more of the following:
hi 1. There have bten significant technical advances
;: in micro-electronics, computers, telecommunications
. i : (including satellites) and so on, which have
; provided the opportunity for the development
; : of new businesses and the growth of c-ome existing
businesses.
2. Industrial research is made more productive and
can advance further in developing new products
and processes by drawing upon the added technical
advances in materials and scientific procedures
as, for example, computer sciences, analytical
and measurement techniques, and physical processes
such as lasers and plasma.
3. The productivity of industrial operations are
improved by the advances in computers and data
handling, controls and automation, sophisticated
inspection and production equipment, inventory
control systems, and so on.
4. Technical graduates entering industrial research
or operations come with a broader competence in
electronics, advanced materials, measurement and
control techniques as a result of the stronger
and more advanced university base.
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These are advantages for the civilian-sector.
Nevertheless, there have been disadvantages even in the
general support for R&D. A principal concern in the period
-, ' ' ' - ~i •.••'-" .
just prior to 1970 was the emphasis on university research
on technical problems related to the challenges of defense I
and space — such as materials science — with an apparent i
lessening of interest in the more mundane needs of the 1
civilian-sector — such as process metallurgy. An immediate \
• - - . , . . . - .
 t . . . . |
consequence was a perceived parallel decline in the interest I
of technical graduates in industrial careers. This percep- !
tion is undoubtedly complicated by the general period of
unrest at/universities in the 1960s, and does not follow
simply from:federal funding of university research.
The point is that federal support of public sector
R&D does affect the civilian-sector in complex ways —
mostly positive, certainly not negligible, and not easily
susceptible to cost-benefit analysis. Can any measures be
taken to improve the effectiveness of this effect? Earlier
in this section, we suggested that "spin-off" receives
recurring attention and is very largely disappointing. One
fundamental basis for such disappointment is that "technology
transfer" normally takes place after the R&D is completed
to the specification of the public-sector need. This is
hardly unexpected, since the public sector provided the
funds.
Suggestions have been made within NASA and DOD that
some consideration to private-sector needs be given much
earlier in the R&D process, while program plans are still
being formulated. Thus, for example, an alloy development
which could have commercial implications might proceed with
joint participation by one or more interested companies.
The private firms would pay incremental costs for the added
R&D required to meet civilian-sector needs, and the final
output would be more easily convertible to economic use.
There are difficulties in such procedures given the
urgency of defense needs, the mixing of public and private
funds, and the .necessary incentives for both parties. But
the concept of early dialogue and involvement in R&D planning
does contain possibility for smoothing some of the mis-match
between public-sector and private-sector needs, hence increas-
ing th'> probability of deriving added value.
We should also point out that the opportunities for
strengthening civilian-sector R&D through the indirect
mechanism of public-sector R&D are very dependent on the ]
technical field and on the nature of the work performed.
Since the bulk of R&D expenditures for both defense and
space are devoted to engineering activities and hardware, *•
only a modest portion of these funds car. be credited with
raising the general reservoir of scientific and engineering
knowledge;. For example, four percent of DOD and 11 percent
of NASA expenditures are considered to be in the'area of
basic research. . .
Nevertheless, public-sector R&D has provided a reser-
voir of professionals across a broad spectrum of sophisticated
technical disciplines. And a very large amount of money
in the past 30 years from these sources has increased our
level of scientific and engineering knowledge.
This has diminished the number of technical people
and funds that could have been devoted to direct support of
civilian-sector. R&D. But those engaged in industrial research
and in related activities funded by government were able to
draw upon a stronger technical base. Since we are dealing
3. Shapley, et. aJL. , Oo. Cit. , pp. 22 and 48.
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here with questions of creativity, of technical ingenuity, .
and of the complex process by which we create and use i
technical change, there is no quantitative estimate possible \
to compare our industrial and economic position today with
what might have been. Would more people devoted to civilian-
sector R&D drawing upon a lower technical base have put us
in a better position than we are in today?
The issue is not calculable, but some judgments are
clear. Civilian-sector R&D has undoubtedly been strengthened
by public-sector R&D. The U.S. is in a strong technical
position today, a leader in many fields, and with a growing
capacity to generate new technology. Once the commitments
are made to public-sector objectives, any civilian-sector
benefits are a bonus. And the bonus in R&D has been consid-
erable.
Ei; : Importance of Existing Technical Community.
An important factor in the initiation and conduct of
any research program is the existence of technical personnel
in the area of interest. This is the essential element in
basic research, and it is a critical factor in the effective-
ness of applied research and development.
The effectiveness of R&D intended for the civilian
sector is often dependent on the existence of a broad range
of available technologies and related technical specialists
throughout the scientific and engineering spectrum. The
conduct and integration of a large-scale R&D activity into
a complex industrial system normally requires contributions
from a range of disciplines and is often dependent on parallel
technical advances in relevant fields. The history of
technology contains many examples of developments that were
! .1
"timely" or "premature." This is due very largely to the
existence or non-e::istence of the required technical system
to render the new development compatible with the potential
applications.
In comparing tha cases of agriculture and housing,
for example, we saw that the much-remarked-upon level of
technical progress in the former case and its equally notice-
able absence in the latter are partly traceable to the well-
developed community of agriculture scientists as compared to
the relative lack of any network of technical specialists in
theibuilding trades. Furthermore, we saw in many cases --
including aircraft arid computers -•- that the development of
one .technology involves a dovetailing with advancing technology
in related support areas. As the Russians discovered, getting
to the moon is as much a problem of computer technology as
of rocket technology.
The point is that there is a critical difference between
public-sector areas, e.g., national security, and civilian-
sector areas. A federal program in which the government is
the final customer can attempt to identify and support all
the necessary technologies required for the complete develop-
ment and application of the technical program in question.
Two of the clearest examples of such efforts in recent years
are the Manhattan Project during World War II and the space
prcgram of the 1960s.
In contrast, federal support of R&D intended for the
civilian sector is dependent for its effective transfer and
integration into economic use on either (1) the ready avail-
ability of appropriate technologies or (2) activities in
the private sector that can eventually develop such technolo-
gies in parallt-. While the federal government can provide
for a particular technical advance, the economic application
may call for simultaneous advances in many related materials
or methods of manufacture.
- . • • • ' "• " .'
It is the function of the market to coordinate much
of the raquired activity. But the judgments and initiatives
required to account for all these factors in civilian-sector
R&D also call for the existence of a technical community
possessing the range of .technologies required, This community
can-.be developed, to some extent and with great effort, by
government funds in public-sector programs. It must be an
existing and participating force for effective civilian-
sector activities.
The .considerations discussed above refer to the limi-
tations of government programs and agencies in providin9 and
controlling the mix of technologies required for technical
advances in the civilian sector. In principle, there is
every reason to assume that any such deficiencies would be
recognized and taken into account prior to initiation of a
given program. . .
There is another aspect, however, which calls for more
detailed interactions between federal R&D programs and the
industry affected. This is the question of technologies •
and skills required for the economic design and manufacture •
of products and processes that would normally follow a
successful R&D program.
Effective industrial research requires reasonable
coupling between the R&D process and the manufacturing.pro-
cess. Knowledge of availably materials that'are suitable
for the processes called for, and an understanding of the
nature of those manufacturing techniques suitable for appli-
cation to the technical advances under consideration, can
be critical to the complete innovation process.
"
1
Thus, the existence of an appropriate technical com- '
munity in the materials, components, and processes of ;
manufacturing reij •'red for the conversion of R&L) is essential
to the effectiveness of any overall program in the civilian
sector. And familiarity with these factors, difficult enough j
witnin an industrial research organization, becomes far more
elusive when we consider fodera.l R&D efforts.
t '• '
For all these reasons, the existence of an appropriate
technical community is critical, and the detailed knowledge
about that community can come only from reasonable participa-
tion of industry in the program. This was an important lesson
in the development of titanium for aircraft, involving close
partnership between government and industry. It is critical <
in current advances in microelectronics, where production is
inseparable front R&D. But the principle is applicable well
beyond these areas of high technology, and is a major consi-
deration for improved effectiveness of federal support for
civilian-sector R&D.
F. Cooperative Industrial Research.
When the federal government supports R&D, it Is acting
collectively for the general public. Yet we have seen that
the federal government acting in the civilian sector can be
inefficient without the involvement of private corporations
responsible for the ultimate investment, manufacturing, and
distribution.
There are indications that some forms of collective
action by the private sector can substitute for government
programs and 3imultaneously provide a mechanism for involving
the judgments and cooperation of the industrial research
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community. Where this approach can be pursued effectively,
it is indeed one to be encouraged. .
There is increased activity by a number of industries
to set up a formal organization which will collect funds
and use them to support both infrastructure R&D for that
industry and, in some sectors, specific developments that
can advance the non-competitive interests of the industry.
The two largest are probably the Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) and the Gas Research Institute. EPRI was
initiated in 1973, and has current annual R&D expenditures
of $217 million. GRI was initiated in 1976, vrith current
'• . ' • • . - 4
annual R&D expenditures of $83.7 million. Two new efforts
now being organized are in the chemical and the semiconductor
industries. Both are planning annual expenditures in the
$20 to $30 million range.
In general, research Uono by trade associations has
been more substantive and productive in Europe than in the
U.S." Basic research funded by trade associations in the
U.S., performed usually at universities, ha.^  been very modest.
Thus, the changes represented by the recent trade association
programs are along two lines:
1. These are sizable commitments by a number of
industries to produce technical advances basic
.. to those industries.
2. They are deliberate efforts, .particularly by the
. chemical and electronic industries, to influonce
the direction of public funds and of university
efforts by indicating those areas of basic science,
and basic engineering of relevance to industry- and
by strengthening particular programs. .
4. Figures are from the 1S80 annual reports of EPRI and GRI,
5. For a balanced view of trade association research in
Britain, see P.S. Johnson, Co-operative Research in
Industry, New York: John.Wiley, 1973. . .
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All of these efforts are being pursued with strict
attention to the guidelines for acceptable cooperative
programs among companies that have evolved from anti-trust
considerations by the Justice Department. Thus, these
collective research efforts emphasize basic infrastructure
R4D or, at most, developments that can be available on non-
exclusive license to all comers.
This presents somewhat of a paradox in recent concerns
about the international competitive position of the United
States. Japanese technology-based products, particularly in
consumer electronics but increasingly in a broad range of
advanced products and systems, appear to demonstrate a capa-
city for rapid and economic adaptation of new scientific
advances. Federal initiatives in stimulating university-
industry or government-industry cooperation, or even coopera-
tive industry efforts compatible with Justice Department
guidelines, have been motivated in part by the desire to
strengthen our technical position vis-a-vis foreign competi-
tors, particularly Japan. Yet these efforts, emphasizing
primarily basic research, publishable results, open licenses
all Jin accord with accepted anti-trust practices —• are of
almost as much benefit to a foreign competitor as to the U.S.
In;fact, if one really believes that Japan is superior to the
U.S. in the ability to adapt and exploit scientific advances,
then such efforts could diminish our competitive position.
We do not accept that extreme interpretation. But
there is a point, raised by several of those interviewed in
this study, that our international competition might be
improved by some forms of collective industrial actions that
would call for some re-appraisal of anti-trust guidelines.
These would lean towards more emphasis on specific developments,
possible restrictions on licensing, and so on. The intent
would be to expedite technical advances while spreading the
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cost and risk, but collective action could presumably be
justified only when it would not lessen our criteria for
domestic competition.
To our knowledge, no good study has been made of the
economic benefits and costs that would be incurred if there
were more joint ventures in applied R&D, nor is the current
legal stance completely clear. We make no legal recommenda-
tions. The topic here, we think, calls for serious study.
There may also be a gray area creating opportunities,
for collective industry actions in applied research and
developments, without calling for a business arrangement
for exploitation by the partners. This might help our
international competitive position or simply substitute
effective private initiatives to replace less effective
federal actions. In either case, there is good reascn to
call for serious consideration by appropriate federa^. agencies
a* to whether laws and regulations intended for domestic
objectives can be modified to accomplish new international
objectives without affecting adversely the original intent.
G. Concluding Remarks. .
We would like to close with what perhaps should have
been the opening. Our concern has been with the "effective-
ness" of federal R&D programs intended for the civilian
sector. By this, we refer to the effective allocations of
technical resources measured by conversion to use within
the economy. And this economy is one in which goods and
services are produced and distributed by the private sector.
We have not considered any social or economic theory
other than this. That is to say, we did not address such
-126-
questions as to whether a particular federal action or
inaction has an effect on the relative distribution of
small companies versus large companies within an industry;
on competition within an industry; on the distribution of
the future work-force in terms of skills.and education; and
so on. Other objectives are implied by such questions, and
there are inevitably inherent conflicts in almost any set
of national objectives. . .
Effective science and technology policy means many
things. In the broadest sense, however, it means two:
first, that we are providing for the health of our national
technical enterprise; second, that we are taking those actions
and adopting those policies which make the optimum use.of our j
total technical resources in achieving a broad range of na- ;
tional objectives. j
- • • • . • - " . . . " ' . . ' " ' . - ' - - • -r
This study focused on one aspect of science and techno- j
... I
logy policy, namely, actions of the federal government to j
support R&D intended to help the civilian sector. We were not j
concerned with support of public-sector R&D, with indirect j
actions of the federal government, or with the industrial
research activities funded by industry.
Thus, on the one hand, we did not seek or obtain a •
complete picture of technical change in the civilian sector. ;
We were, however, made acutely conscious of the major factors
that influence this change and the interactions they have :
with each other. We have attempted to bring these perspec-
tives to bear upon the one factor that was our objective:
direct R&D support by the federal government. ;
• ' . ' ' ii
Hence, a simple overriding guideline for such direct •
federal actions is that they must be taken with full know- j
ledge of the other factors influencing technical change, and j
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with the conscious effort to develop mechanisms that link j
the factors together. Our discussion of general principles j
and specific underlying themes presented in this final I
chapter spell out many of the implications of this statement. ;
' - • j
And when should the federal government become involved
in supporting civilian-sector R&D? The answer is essentially
a political one. We have chosen to take "effectiveness" as !
a basis for the answer, and to measure this in terms of our
economic system wherein the private sector is responsible'for
the ultimate manufacture and sale of economic goods derived
from technical change. Any other measure for economic or
social reasons would pay some price in cost or time or opLi-
mum allocation of technical resources.
:We have not provided a set of recommended direct
actions, but rather a set of recommended indirect guidelines. s
This;is not a solution to the question of how and when the :;
federal government should provide for the most effective sup- -..!
port of civilian-sector R&D. It is, however, a suggested 5
road ;map towards that solution. I
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